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Functions of Deviance in Groups

DENTLER AND ERIKSON

The Delinquent Gang as a Near Group

YABLONSKY

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THE FUNCTIONS OF DEVIANCE IN GROUPS

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Although sociologists have repeatedly noted that close similarities exist between various forms of social marginality, research directed at these forms has only begun to mark the path toward a social theory of deviance. This slow pace may in part result from the fact that deviant behavior is too frequently visualized as a product of organizational failure rather than as a facet of organization itself.

Albert Cohen has recently attempted to specify some of the assumptions and definitions necessary for a sociology of deviant behavior (3). He has urged the importance of erecting clearly defined concepts, devising a homogeneous class of phenomena explainable by a unified system of theory, and developing a sociological rather than a psychological framework—as would be the case, for example, in a central problem which was stated: "What is it about the structure of social systems that determines the kinds of criminal acts that occur in these systems and the way in which such acts are distributed within the systems?" (3, p. 462). Cohen has also suggested that a theory of deviant behavior should account simultaneously for deviance and conformity; that is, the explanation of one should serve as the explanation of the other.

In this paper we hope to contribute to these objectives by presenting some propositions about the sources and functions of deviant behavior in small groups. Although we suspect that the same general processes may well characterize larger social systems,* this

*One of the authors (Erikson) is currently preparing a paper which deals with the broader implications of the problems discussed here.

paper will be limited to small groups, and more particularly to enduring task and primary groups. Any set of propositions about the functions of deviance would have to be shaped to fit the scope of the social unit chosen for analysis, and we have elected to use the small group unit in this exploratory paper primarily because a large body of empirical material dealing with deviance in groups has accumulated which offers important leads into the study of deviance in general.

With Cohen, we define deviance as "behavior which violates institutionalized expectations, that is, expectations which are shared and recognized as legitimate within a social system" (3, p. 462). Our guiding assumption is that deviant behavior is a reflection not only of the personality of the actor, but the structure of the group in which the behavior was enacted. The violations of expectation which the group experiences, as well as the norms which it observes, express both cultural and structural aspects of the group. While we shall attend to cultural elements in later illustrations, our propositions are addressed primarily to the structure of groups and the functions that deviant behavior serves in maintaining this structure.

PROPOSITION ONE

Our first proposition is that groups tend to induce, sustain, and permit deviant behavior. To say that a group induces deviant behavior, here, is to say that as it goes through the early stages of development and structures the range of behavior among its members, a group will tend to define the behavior of certain members as deviant. A group sustains or permits

this newly defined deviance in the sense that it tends to institutionalize and absorb this behavior into its structure rather than eliminating it. As group structure emerges and role specialization takes place, one or more role categories will be differentiated to accommodate individuals whose behavior is occasionally or regularly expected to be deviant. It is essential to the argument that this process be viewed not only as a simple group adjustment to individual differences, but also as a requirement of group formation, analogous to the requirement of leadership.

The process of role differentiation and specialization which takes place in groups has been illuminated by studies which use concepts of sociometric rank. Riecken and Homans conclude from this evidence: "The higher the rank of a member the closer his activities come to realizing the norms of the group . . . and there is a tendency toward 'equilibration of rank'" (11, p. 794). Thus the rankings that take place on a scale of social preference serve to identify the activities that members are expected to carry out: each general rank represents or contains an equivalent role which defines that member's special relationship to the group and its norms. To the extent that a group ranks its members preferentially, it distributes functions differentially. The proposition, then, simply notes that group members who violate norms will be given low sociometric rank; that this designation carries with it an appropriate differentiation of the functions that such members are expected to perform in respect to the group; and that the roles contained in these low-rank positions become institutionalized and are retained in the structure of the group.]

The most difficult aspect of this proposition is the concept of *induction* of deviance. We do not mean to sug-

gest that the group creates the motives for an individual's deviant behavior or compels it from persons not otherwise disposed toward this form of expression. When a person encounters a new group, two different historical continuities meet. The individual brings to the group a background of private experience which disposes him to certain patterns of conduct; the group, on the other hand, is organized around a network of role priorities to which each member is required to conform. While the individual brings new resources into the group and alters its potential for change and innovation, the group certainly operates to rephrase each member's private experience into a new self-formula, a new sense of his own needs.

Thus any encounter between a group and a new member is an event which is novel to the experience of both. In the trial-and-error behavior which issues, both the functional requirements of the group and the individual needs of the person will undergo certain revisions, and in the process the group plays an important part in determining whether those already disposed toward deviant behavior will actually express it overtly, or whether those who are lightly disposed toward deviating styles will be encouraged to develop that potential.

Inducing deviance, then, is meant to be a process by which the group channels and organizes the deviant possibilities contained in its membership.]

The proposition argues that groups induce deviant behavior in the same sense that they induce other group qualities like leadership, fellowship, and so on.] These qualities emerge early and clearly in the formation of new groups, even in traditionless laboratory groups, and while they may be diffusely distributed among the membership initially they tend toward specificity and equilibrium over time. In giving definition to the end points

in the range of behavior which is brought to a group by its membership, the group establishes its boundaries and gives dimension to its structure. In this process, the designation of low-ranking deviants emerges as surely as the designation of high-ranking task leaders.

PROPOSITION TWO

Bales has written:

The displacement of hostilities on a scapegoat at the bottom of the status structure is one mechanism, apparently, by which the ambivalent attitudes toward the . . . 'top man' . . . can be diverted and drained off. These patterns, culturally elaborated and various in form, can be viewed as particular cases of mechanisms relevant to the much more general problem of equilibrium (2, p. 454).

This comment provides a bridge between our first and second propositions by suggesting that deviant behavior may serve important functions for groups — thereby contributing to, rather than disrupting, equilibrium in the group. Our second proposition, accordingly, is that *deviant behavior functions in enduring groups to help maintain group equilibrium.* (In the following discussion we would like to consider some of the ways this function operates.)

(*Group performance.* The proposition implies that deviant behavior contributes to the maintenance of optimum levels of performance, and we add at this point that this will particularly obtain where a group's achievement depends upon the contributions of all its members.)

McCurdy and Lambert devised a laboratory task which required full group participation in finding a solution to a given problem (7). They found that the performance of their groups compared unfavorably with that of individual problem-solvers, and explained this by noting the high likelihood that a group would contain at least one member who failed to attend

to instructions. The group, they observed, may prove no stronger than its weakest member. The implication here, as in the old adage, seems to be that the group would have become correspondingly stronger if its weakest link were removed. Yet this implication requires some consideration: to what extent can we say that the inattentive member was acting in the name of the group, performing a function which is valuable to the group over time? To what extent can we call this behavior a product of group structure rather than a product of individual eccentricity?

As roles and their equivalent ranks become differentiated in a group, some members will be expected to perform more capably than others; and in turn the structure of the group will certainly be organized to take advantage of the relative capabilities of its members — as it demonstrably does in leadership choice. These differentials require testing and experimentation: the norms about performance in a group cannot emerge until clues appear as to how much the present membership can accomplish, how wide the range of variation in performance is likely to be, and so on. To the extent that group structure becomes an elaboration and organization of these differentials, certainly the "weak link" becomes as essential to this process as the high-producer. Both are outside links in the communication system which feeds back information about the range of group performance and the limits of the differentiated structure.

As this basis for differentiation becomes established, then, the group moves from a state in which pressure is exerted equally on all members to conform to performance norms, and moves toward a state in which these norms become a kind of anchor which locates the center of wide variations in behavior. The performance 'mean' of a group is of course expected to be set

at a level dictated by 'norms'; and this mean is not only achieved by the most conforming members but by a balance of high and low producers as well. It is a simple calculation that the loss of a weak-link, the low producer, would raise the mean output of the group to a point where it no longer corresponded to original norms unless the entire structure of the group shifted as compensation. In this sense we can argue that neither role differentiation nor norm formation could occur and be maintained without the "aid" of regular deviations.

Rewards. Stated briefly, we would argue that the process of distributing incentives to members of the group is similarly dependent upon the recurrence of deviant behavior. This is an instance where, as Cohen has urged, an explanation of conformity may lead to an explanation of deviance. Customarily, conformance is rewarded while deviance is either unrewarded or actively punished. The rewards of conformity, however, are seen as "rewarding" in comparison to other possible outcomes, and obviously the presence of a deviant in the group would provide the continual contrast without which the reward structure would have little meaning. The problem, then, becomes complex: the reward structure is set up as an incentive for conformity, but depends upon the outcome that differentials in conformity will occur. As shall be pointed out later, the deviant is rewarded in another sense for his role in the group, which makes it "profitable" for him to serve as a contrast in the conventional reward structure. Generally speaking, comparison is as essential in the maintenance of norms as is conformity: a norm becomes most evident in its occasional violation, and in this sense a group maintains "equilibrium" by a controlled balance of the relations which provide comparison and those which assure conformity.

Boundaries. Implicit in the foregoing is the argument that the presence of deviance in a group is a boundary maintaining function. The comparisons which deviance makes possible help establish the range in which the group operates, the extent of its jurisdiction over behavior, the variety of styles it contains, and these are among the essential dimensions which give a group identity and distinctiveness. In Quaker work camps, Riecken found that members prided themselves on their acceptance of deviations, and rejected such controls as ridicule and rejection (10, pp. 57-67). Homans has noted that men in the Bank Wiring Group employed certain sanctions against deviant behavior which were felt to be peculiar to the structure of the group (5). A group is distinguished in part by the norms it creates for handling deviance and by the forms of deviance it is able to absorb and contain. In helping, then, to give members a sense of their group's distinctiveness, deviant behavior on the group's margins provides an important boundary-maintaining function.

PROPOSITION THREE

Kelley and Thibault have asserted:

It is common knowledge that when a member deviates markedly from a group standard, the remaining members of the group bring pressures to bear on the deviate to return to conformity. If pressure is of no avail, the deviate is rejected and cast out of the group. The research on this point is consistent with common sense (6, p. 768).

Apparently a deviating member who was *not* rejected after repeated violations would be defined as one who did not deviate markedly enough. While there is considerable justification to support this common-sense notion, we suggest that it overattends to rejection and neglects the range of alternatives short of rejection. The same focus is evident in the following statement by Rossi and Merton:

What the individual experiences as estrangement from a group tends to be experienced by his associates as repudiation of the group, and this ordinarily evokes a hostile response. As social relations between the individual and the rest of the group deteriorate, the norms of the group become less binding for him. For since he is progressively seceding from the group and being penalized by it, he is the less likely to experience rewards for adherence to . . . norms. Once initiated, this process seems to move toward a cumulative detachment from the group (8, p. 270).

While both of the above quotations reflect current research concerns in their attention to the group's rejection of the individual and his alienation from the group, our third proposition [focuses on the common situation in which the group works to prevent elimination of a deviant member. *Groups will resist any trend toward alienation of a member whose behavior is deviant.*] From the point of view of the group majority, deviants will be retained in the group up to a point where the deviant expression becomes critically dangerous to group solidarity. This accords with Kelley and Thibault's general statement, if not with its implication; but we would add that the point at which deviation becomes "markedly" extreme — and dangerous to the group — cannot be well defined in advance. This point is located by the group as a result of recurrent interaction between conforming members who respect the central norms of the group and deviating members who test its boundaries. This is the context from which the group derives a conception of what constitutes "danger," or what variations from the norm shall be viewed as "marked."

From the point of view of the deviant, then, the testing of limits is an exercise of his role in the group; from the point of view of the group, pressures are set into motion which secure the deviant in his "testing" role, yet try to assure that his deviation will not

become pronounced enough to make rejection necessary. Obviously this is a delicate balance to maintain, and failures are continually visible. Yet there are a great many conditions under which it is worth while for the group to retain its deviant members and resist any trend which might lead the majority membership and other deviant members to progressive estrangement.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF PROPOSITIONS

Each of the authors of this paper has recently completed field research which illuminates the propositions set forth here. Dentler studied the relative effectiveness of ten Quaker work projects in influencing conformity with norms of tolerance, pacifism, democratic group relations, and related social attitudes (4). One interesting sidelight in this study was the finding that while all ten groups were highly solidary, those with relatively higher numbers of sociometric isolates exhibited higher degrees of favorable increased conformity.

Case study of five of the ten groups, using interviews and participant observation, revealed that the two groups achieving the greatest favorable changes in tolerance, democratism, pacifism, and associated attitudes not only had the highest proportions of social isolates, but some of the isolates were low-ranking deviants. Of course none of the groups was without at least one isolate and one deviant, and these roles were not always occupied by the same member. But in the two high-change groups low-rank deviants were present.

In one group, one of these members came from a background that differed radically from those of other members. Although these were cooperative living and work projects, this member insisted upon separately prepared special food and complained loudly about its quality. Where three-fourths of the

group members came from professional and managerial families, and dressed and acted in conformity with upper-middle-class standards, this deviant refused to wear a shirt to Sunday dinner and often came to meals without his shoes. He could not hold a job and lost two provided by the group leader during the first two weeks of the program.

His social and political attitudes also differed radically from group norms, and he was often belligerently assertive of his minority perspectives. He had no allies for his views. In an interview one of the group leaders described the group's response to this deviant:

At first we didn't know how to cope with him though we were determined to do just that. After he came to Sunday dinner in his undershirt, and after he smashed a bowl of food that had been fixed specially for him—as usual—we figured out a way to set down certain firm manners for him. There were some rules, we decided, that no one was going to violate. We knew he was very new to this kind of life and so we sought to understand him. We never rejected him. Finally, he began to come to terms; he adapted, at least enough so that we can live with him. He has begun to conform on the surface to some of our ways. It's been very hard to take that he is really proud of having lost his first two jobs and is not quiet about it. Things have gone better since we made a birthday cake for him, and I feel proud of the way our group has managed to handle this internal problem.

The same group sustained another deviant and even worked hard to retain him when he decided to leave the group. Here a group leader discusses group relations with this member:

X left our group after the first four weeks of the eight-week program. He had never been away from home before although he was about 21 years old. He couldn't seem to adjust to his job at the day camp, and he just couldn't stand doing his share of the housework and cooking. This lack of doing his share was especially hard on us, and we often discussed privately whether it would be good for him to relieve him of any household chores. We decided that

wouldn't be right, but we still couldn't get him to work. Funny, but this sort of made housework the center of our group life. We are proud that no one else has shirked his chores; there is no quibbling now. . . . Anyway, X kept being pressured by his mother and brother to come home, but we gave him tremendous support. We talked it all out with him. We let him know we really wanted him to stay. This seemed to unify our group. It was working out the problem of X that seemed to unify our group. It was working out the problem of X that seemed to help us build some group standards. He began to follow some of our standards but he also stayed free to dissent. His mother finally forced him to come home.

In the second high-change group, there were also two extreme deviants. Here a group leader comments on one of them:

I've never got over feeling strongly antagonistic toward K. K has been a real troublemaker and we never really came to terms with him or controlled him significantly. He is simply a highly neurotic, conflicted person as far as life in our group goes. Personally, I've resented the fact that he has monopolized Z, who without him would have been a real contributor but who has become nothing more than a sort of poor imitation of K. After we had been here about half the summer, incidentally, a professional came out from staff headquarters and after observing our meetings he asked why K hadn't been dismissed or asked to leave the group early in the summer. But K didn't leave, of course, and most of us wouldn't want him to leave.

Finally a group leader described the reaction to the departure of its second deviant, who was repeatedly described in interviews as "kind of obnoxious:"

On the night N was upstairs talking with your interviewer, the group got together downstairs suddenly to talk about getting up a quick party, a farewell party for him. In 15 minutes, like a whirlwind, we decorated the house and some of the fellows wrote a special song of farewell for N. We also wrote a last-minute appeal asking him to stay with the group and people ran about asking, "What are you doing for N?" There seemed to be a lot of guilt among us about his leaving. We felt that maybe we hadn't done enough to get him more involved in the life of our group. I think there was some

hidden envy too. After he had left, a joke began to spread around that went like this: If you leave now maybe we'll have a party for you.

The group with the lowest amount of change during the summer contained two low-ranking members, one of whom deviated from the group's norms occasionally, but no evidence came to light to indicate that this group achieved the same intensity in social relationships or the same degree of role differentiation as did groups with more extremely deviant members. Members of this low-change group reflected almost without exception the views expressed in this typical quotation:

Objectively, this is a good, congenial group of individuals. Personally they leave me a little cold. I've been in other project groups, and this is the most congenial one I've been in; yet, I don't think there will be any lasting friendships.

All these quotations reflect strong impressions embodied in our observational reports. Taken as a whole they illustrate aspects of our three postulates. While this material does not reveal the sense in which a group may induce deviance—and this is perhaps the most critical proposition of all—it does show how groups will make great efforts to keep deviant members attached to the group, to prevent full alienation. By referring to our findings about attitude change we have hoped to suggest the relevance of deviance to increasing conformity, a functional relationship of action and reaction.

In 1955-6, Erikson participated in a study of schizophrenia among basic trainees in the U. S. Army, portions of which have been published elsewhere (1). Through various interview and questionnaire techniques, a large body of data was collected which enabled the investigators to reconstruct short histories of the group life shared by the future schizophrenic and his squad prior to the former's hospitalization.

There were eleven subjects in the data under consideration. The bulk of the evidence used for this short report comes from loosely structured interviews which were conducted with the entire squad in attendance, shortly after it had lost one of its members to the psychiatric hospital.

The eleven young men whose breakdown was the subject of the interviews all came from the north-eastern corner of the United States, most of them from rural or small-town communities. Typically, these men had accumulated long records of deviation in civilian life: while few of them had attracted psychiatric attention, they had left behind them fairly consistent records of job failure, school truancy, and other minor difficulties in the community. Persons in the community took notice of this behavior, of course, but they tended to be gently puzzled by it rather than attributing distinct deviant motives to it.

When such a person enters the service, vaguely aware that his past performance did not entirely live up to expectations current in his community, he is likely to start negotiating with his squad mates about the conditions of his membership in the group. He sees himself as warranting special group consideration, as a consequence of a deviant style which he himself is unable to define; yet the group has clear-cut obligations which require a high degree of responsibility and coordination from everyone. The negotiation seems to go through several successive stages, during which a reversal of original positions takes place and the individual is fitted for a role which is clearly deviant.

The first stage is characteristic of the recruit's first days in camp. His initial reaction is likely to be an abrupt attempt to discard his entire "civilian" repertoire to free himself for adoption of new styles and new ways. His new uniform for daily wear seems to be-

come for him a symbolic uniform for his sense of identity: he is, in short, overconforming. He is likely to interpret any gesture of command as a literal moral mandate, sometimes suffering injury when told to scrub the floor until his fingers bleed, or trying to consciously repress thoughts of home when told to get everything out of his head but the military exercise of the moment.

The second stage begins shortly thereafter as he fails to recognize that "regulation" reality is different from the reality of group life, and that the circuits which carry useful information are contained within the more informal source. The pre-psychotic is, to begin with, a person for whom contacts with peers are not easy to establish, and as he tries to find his way into these circuits, looking for cues to the rhythm of group life, he sees that a fairly standard set of interaction techniques is in use. There are ways to initiate conversation, ways to impose demands, and so on. Out of this cultural lore, then, he chooses different gambits to test. He may learn to ask for matches to start discussion, be ready with a supply of cigarettes for others to "bum," or he may pick up a local joke or expression and repeat it continually. Too often, however, he misses the context in which these interaction cues are appropriate, so that his behavior, in its over-literal simplicity, becomes almost a caricature of the sociability rule he is trying to follow. We may cite the "specialist" in giving away cigarettes:

I was out of cigarettes and he had a whole pack. I said, "Joe, you got a smoke?" He says "yes" and Jesus, he gave me about twelve of them. At other times he used to offer me two or three packs of cigarettes at a time when I was out.

Or the "specialist" in greetings:

He'd go by you in the barracks and say, "What do you say, Jake?" I'd say, "Hi, George, how are you?" and he'd walk into the latrine. And he'd come by not

a minute later, and it's the same thing all over again, "What do you say, Jake?" It seemed to me he was always saying "hi" to someone. You could be sitting right beside him for ten minutes and he would keep on saying it.

These clumsy overtures lead the individual and the group into the third stage. Here the recruit, almost hidden from group view in his earlier overconformity, has become a highly visible group object: his behavior is clearly "off beat," anomalous; he has made a presentation of himself to the squad, and the squad has had either to make provisions for him in the group structure or begin the process of eliminating him. The pre-psychotic is clearly a low producer, and in this sense he is potentially a handicap. Yet the group neither exerts strong pressures on him to conform nor attempts to expel him from the squad. Instead, he is typically given a wide license to deviate from both the performance and behavior norms of the group, and the group in turn forms a hard protective shell around him which hides him from exposure to outside authorities.

His duties are performed by others, and in response the squad only seems to ask of him that he be at least consistent in his deviation — that he be consistently helpless and consistently anomalous. In a sense, he becomes the ward of the group, hidden from outside view but the object of friendly ridicule within. He is referred to as "our teddy bear," "our pet," "mascot," "little brother," "toy," and so on. In a setting where having buddies is highly valued, he is unlikely to receive any sociometric choices at all. But it would be quite unfortunate to assume that he is therefore isolated from the group or repudiated by it: an accurate sociogram would have the deviant individual encircled by the interlocking sociometric preferences, sheltered by the group structure, and an important point of reference for it.

The examples just presented are

weak in that they include only failures of the process described. The shell which protected the deviant from visibility leaked, outside medical authorities were notified, and he was eventually hospitalized. But as a final note it is interesting to observe that the shell remained even after the person for whom it was erected had withdrawn. Large portions of every squad interview were devoted to arguments, directed at a psychiatrist, that the departed member was not ill and should never have been hospitalized.

DISCUSSION

The most widely cited social theories of deviant behavior which have appeared in recent years—notably those of Merton and Parsons (8; 9)—have helped turn sociologists' attention from earlier models of social pathology in which deviance was seen as direct evidence of disorganization. These newer models have attended to the problem of how social structures exert pressure on certain individuals rather than others toward the expression of deviance. Yet the break with the older social disorganization tradition is only partial, since these theories still regard deviance from the point of view of its value as a "symptom" of dysfunctional structures. One aim of this paper is to encourage a functional approach to deviance, to consider the contributions deviant behavior may make toward the development of organizational structures, rather than focusing on the implicit assumption that structures must be somehow in a state of disrepair if they produce deviant behavior.

Any group attempts to locate its position in social space by defining its symbolic boundaries, and this process of self-location takes place not only in reference to the central norms which the group develops but in reference to the *range* of possibilities which the culture makes available. Specialized statuses which are located on the

margins of the group, chiefly high-rank leaders and low-rank deviants, become critical referents for establishing the end points of this range, the group boundaries.

As both the Quaker and Army illustrations suggest, deviant members are important targets toward which group concerns become focused. Not only do they symbolize the group's activities, but they help give other members a sense of group size, its range and extent, by marking where the group begins and ends in space. In general, the deviant seems to help give the group structure a visible "shape." The deviant is someone about whom something should be done, and the group, in expressing this concern, is able to reaffirm its essential cohesion and indicate what the group is and what it can do. Of course the character of the deviant behavior in each group would vary with the group's general objectives, its relationship to the larger culture, and so on. In both the Quaker groups and Army squads, nurturance was a strong element of the other members' reaction to their deviant fellow. More specifically in the Army material it is fairly sure that the degree of helplessness and softness supplied by the pre-psychotic introduced emotional qualities which the population—lacking women and younger persons—could not otherwise afford.

These have been short and necessarily limited illustrations of the propositions advanced. In a brief final note we would like to point out how this crude theory could articulate with the small group research tradition by suggesting one relatively ideal laboratory procedure that might be used. Groups composed of extremely homogeneous members should be assigned tasks which require group solution but which impose a high similarity of activity upon all members. If role differentiation occurs, then, it would be less a product of individual differences or

the specific requirements of the task than a product of group formation. We would hypothesize that such differentiation would take place, and that one or more roles thus differentiated would be reserved for deviants. The occupants of these deviant roles should be removed from the group. If the propositions have substance, the group—and this is the critical hypothesis—would realign its members so that these roles would become occupied by other members. While no single experiment could address all the implications of our paradigm, this one would confront its main point.

This paper, of course, has deliberately neglected those group conditions in which deviant behavior becomes dysfunctional: it is a frequent group experience that deviant behavior fails to provide a valued function for the structure and helps reduce performance standards or lower levels of interaction. We have attempted here to present a side of the coin which we felt was often neglected, and in our turn we are equally—if intentionally—guilty of neglect.

SUMMARY

This paper has proposed the following interpretations of deviant behavior in enduring primary and task groups:

1. Deviant behavior tends to be induced, permitted, and sustained by a given group.
2. Deviant behavior functions to help maintain group equilibrium.
3. Groups will resist any trend toward alienation of a member whose behavior is deviant.

The substance of each proposition was discussed heuristically and illustrated by reference to field studies of deviant behavior in Quaker work

projects and Army basic training squads. A laboratory test was suggested as one kind of critical test of the paradigm. The aim of the presentation was to direct attention to the functional interdependence of deviance and organization.

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THE DELINQUENT GANG AS A NEAR-GROUP*

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This paper is based on four years of research and direct work with some thirty delinquent gangs in New York City. During this period I directed a crime prevention program on the upper West Side of Manhattan for Morningside Heights, Inc., a community social agency sponsored by fourteen major institutions including Columbia University, Barnard, Teacher's College, Union Theological Seminary, and Riverside Church.

Approaches used in data gathering included field study methods, participant observation, role-playing, group interaction analysis, and sociometry. The data were obtained through close daily interaction with gang boys over the four-year period during which I was the director of the project.

Although data were obtained on 30 gangs, the study focused on two, the Balkans and the Egyptian Kings. It was the latter which committed the brutal killing of a polio victim, Michael Farmer, in an upper west side park of New York City. The trial lasted over three months and received nation-wide attention. These two groups were intensively interviewed and contributed heavily to the formulation of a theory of near-groups. In addition to the analysis of the gang's structure, a number of delinquent gang war events produced vital case material.

There is a paucity of available theory based on empirical evidence about the structure of delinquent gangs. Two landmarks in the field are Thrasher's *The Gang* and Whyte's *Street Corner Society*. Some recent publications and

controversy focus on the emergence of gangs and their function for gang members. Professor Cohen deals with gangs as sub-cultures organized by working-class boys as a reaction to middle-class values (1). In a recent publication Block and Nederhoffer discuss gangs as organizations designed to satisfy the adolescent's striving for the attainment of adult status (2).

Although partial group structuring has been extensively discussed in sociological literature on "groups," "crowds," and "mobs," my gang research revealed that these collectivity constructs did not seem to adequately describe and properly abstract the underlying structural characteristics of the delinquent gang. Consequently, I have attempted here to construct a formulation which would draw together various described social dimensions of the gang under one conceptual scheme. I call this formulation Near-Group Theory.

NEAR-GROUP THEORY

One way of viewing human collectivities is on a continuum of organization characteristics. At one extreme, we have a highly organized, cohesive, functioning collection of individuals as members of a sociological group. At the other extreme, we have a mob of individuals characterized by anonymity, disturbed leadership, motivated by emotion, and in some cases representing a destructive collectivity within the inclusive social system. When these structures are observed in extreme, their form is apparent to the observer. However, in viewing these social structures on a continuum, those formations which tend to be neither quite a cohesive integrated group nor a disturbed mal-functioning mob or crowd are often distorted by observers in one or the other direction.

*This is a revised version of a paper delivered at The Eastern Sociological Meetings in New York City, April 11, 1959. The theory of near-groups and gang data presented in this paper is part of a forthcoming volume on gangs by the author.

A central thesis of this paper is that mid-way on the group-mob continuum are collectivities which are neither groups nor mobs. These are structures prevalent enough in a social system to command attention in their own right as constructs for sociological analysis. Near-groups are characterized by some of the following factors: (1) diffuse role definition, (2) limited cohesion, (3) impermanence, (4) minimal consensus of norms, (5) shifting membership, (6) disturbed leadership, and (7) limited definition of membership expectations. These factors characterize the near-group's "normal" structure.

True groups may manifest near-group structure under stress, in transition, or when temporarily disorganized; however, at these times they are moving toward or away from their normative, permanent structure. The near-group manifests its homeostasis in accord with the factors indicated. It never fully becomes a *group* or a *mob*.

THE GANG AS A NEAR-GROUP PATTERN

Some recent sociological theory and discourse on gangs suffers from distortions of gang structure to fit a group rather than a near-group conception. Most gang theorizing begins with an automatic assumption that gangs are defined sociological groups. Many of these misconceived theories about gangs in sociological treatises are derived from the popular and traditional image of gangs held by the general public as reported in the press, rather than as based upon empirical scientific investigation. The following case material reveals the disparities between popular reports of gang war behavior and their organization as revealed by more systematic study.

The official report of a gang fight, which made headlines in New York

papers as the biggest in the city's history, detailed a gang war between six gangs over a territorial dispute.* The police, social workers, the press, and the public accepted a defined version of groups meeting in battle over territory. Research into this gang war incident, utilizing a near-group concept of gangs, indicates another picture of the situation.

N. Y. Daily News

NIP 200 — PUNK FIGHT NEAR COLUMBIA CAMPUS

by Grover Ryder and Jack Smee

A flying squad of 25 cops, alerted by a civilian's tip, broke up the makings of one of the biggest gang rumbles in the city's turbulent teen history last night at the edge of Columbia University campus on Morningside Heights.

N. Y. Herald Tribune

POLICE SEIZE 38, AVERT GANG BATTLE — RIVERSIDE PARK RULE WAS GOAL

Police broke up what they said might have been "a very serious" battle between two juvenile factions last night as they intercepted thirty-eight youths.

N. Y. Times

GANG WAR OVER PARK BROKEN BY POLICE

The West Side police broke up an impending gang fight near Columbia University last night as 200 teen-agers were massing for battle over exclusive rights to the use of Riverside Park.

N. Y. Journal-American

6-GANG BATTLE FOR PARK AVERTED NEAR GRANT'S TOMB COPS PATROL TROUBLE SPOT

Police reinforcements today patrolled Morningside Heights to prevent a teen-aged gang war for "control" of Riverside Park.

World-Telegram and Sun

HOODLUM WAR AVERTED AS COPS ACT FAST

38 to 200 Seized near Columbia
by Richard Graf

Fast police action averted what threatened to be one of the biggest street gang fights in the city's history as some 200 hoodlums massed last night on the upper West Side to battle over "exclusive rights" to Riverside Park.

*New York Newspaper Headlines —
June 11, 1955:

Depth interviews with 40 gang boys, most of whom had been arrested at the scene of the gang fight, revealed a variety of reasons for attendance at the battle. There were also varied perceptions of the event and the gangs involved reported simply in the press as "gangs battling over territory." Some of the following recurring themes were revealed in the gang boys' responses.

Estimates of number of gang boys present varied from 80 to 5,000.

Gang boys interviewed explained their presence at the "battle" as follows:

I didn't have anything to do that night and wanted to see what was going to happen.

Those guys called me a Spic and I was going to get even. [He made this comment even though the "rival" gangs were mostly Puerto Ricans.]

They always picked on us. [The "they" is usually a vague reference.]

I always like a fight; it keeps up my rep.

My father threw me out of the house; I wanted to get somebody and heard about the fight.

The youth who was responsible for "calling on" the gang war—the reputed Balkan Gang leader—presented this version of the event:

That night I was out walkin' my dog about 7:30. Then I saw all these guys coming from different directions. I couldn't figure out what was happening. Then I saw some of the guys I know and I remembered we had called it on for that night.

I never really figured the Politicians [a supposed "brother Gang" he had called] would show.

Another boy added another dimension to "gang war organization":

How did we get our name? Well, when we were in the police station, the cops kept askin' us who we were. Jay was studying history in school—so he said how about The Balkans. Let's call ourselves Balkans. So we told the cops—we're the Balkans—and that was it.

Extensive data revealed this was not

a case of two organized groups meeting in battle. The press, public, police, social workers, and others projected group conceptions onto a near-group activity. Most of the youths at the scene of the gang war were, in fact, participating in a kind of mob action. Most had no real concept of belonging to any gang or group; however, they were interested in a situation which might be exciting and possibly a channel for expressing some of their aggressions and hostilities. Although it was not necessarily a defined war, the possibilities of a stabbing or even a killing were high—with a few hundred disturbed and fearful youths milling around in the undefined situation. The gang war was not a social situation of two structured teen-aged armies meeting on a battlefield to act out a defined situation; it was a case of two near-groups in action.

Another boy's participation in this gang war further reveals its structure. The evening of the fight he had nothing to do, heard about this event and decided that he would wander up to see what was going to happen. On his way to the scene of the rumored gang fight he thought it might be a good idea to invite a few friends "just to be on the safe side." This swelled the final number of youths arriving at the scene of the gang fight, since other boys did the same. He denied (and I had no reason to disbelieve him) belonging to either of the gangs and the same applied to his friends. He was arrested at the scene of "battle" for disorderly conduct and weapon-carrying.

I asked him why he had carried a knife and a zip gun on his person when he went to the gang fight if he did not belong to either of the reputed gangs and intended to be merely a "peaceful observer." His response: "Man, I'm not going to a rumble without packin'." The boy took along weapons for self-defense in the event

he was attacked. The possibilities of his being attacked in an hysterical situation involving hundreds of youths who had no clear idea of what they were doing at the scene of a gang fight was, of course, great. Therefore, he was correct (within his social framework) in taking along a weapon for self-protection.

These characteristic responses to the situation when multiplied by the numbers of others present characterizes the problem. What may be a confused situation involving many aggressive youths (belonging to near-groups) is often defined as a case of two highly mechanized and organized gang groups battling each other with definition to their activities.

In another "gang war case" which made headlines, a psychotic youth acted out his syndrome by stabbing another youth. When arrested and questioned about committing the offense, the youth stated that he was a member of a gang carrying out retaliation against another gang, which was out to get him. He attributed his assault to gang affiliation.

The psychotic youth used the malleable near-group, the gang, as his *psychotic* syndrome. Napoleon, God, Christ, and other psychotic syndromes, so popular over the years, may have been replaced on city streets by gang membership. Not only is it a convenient syndrome, but some disturbed youths find their behavior as rational, accepted, and even aggrandized by many representatives of society. Officials such as police officers and social workers, in their interpretation of the incident, often amplify this individual behavior by a youth into a group gang war condition because it is a seemingly more logical explanation of a senseless act.

In the case of the Balkans, the societal response of viewing them as a group rather than a near-group so-

lidified their structure. After the incident, as one leader stated it, "lots more kids wanted to join."

Another gang war event further reveals the near-group structure of the gang. On the night of July 30, 1957, a polio victim named Michael Farmer was beaten and stabbed to death by a gang varying known as the Egyptian Kings and the Dragons. The boys who participated in this homicide came from the upper West Side of Manhattan. I had contact with many of these boys prior to the event and was known to others through the community program I directed. Because of this prior relationship the boys cooperated and responded openly when I interviewed them in the institutions where they were being held in custody.*

Responses to my interviews indicated the near-group nature of the gang. Some of the pertinent responses which reveal this characteristic of the Egyptian King gang structure are somewhat demonstrated by the following comments made by five of the participants in the killing. (These are representative comments selected from over ten hours of recorded interviews.)

I was walking uptown with a couple of friends and we ran into Magician [one of the Egyptian King gang leaders] and them there. They asked us if we wanted to go to a fight, and we said yes. When he asked me if I wanted to go to a fight, I couldn't say no. I mean, I could say no, but for old time's sake, I said yes.

Everyone was pushin' and I pulled out my knife. I saw this face—I never seen it before, so I stabbed it.

He was laying on the ground lookin'

*The research and interviewing at this time was combined with my role as consultant to the Columbia Broadcasting System. I assisted in the production of a gang war documentary narrated by Edward R. Murrow, entitled "Who Killed Michael Farmer?" The documentary tells the story of the killing through the actual voices of the boys who committed the act.

up at us. Everyone was kicking, punching, stabbing. I kicked him on the jaw or someplace; then I kicked him in the stomach. That was the least I could do was kick 'im.

They have guys watching you and if you don't stab or hit somebody, they get you later. I hit him over the head with a bat. [Gang youths are unable to articulate specific individuals of the vague "they" who watch over them.]

I don't know how many guys are in the gang. They tell me maybe a hundred or a thousand. I don't know them all. [Each boy interviewed had a different image of the gang.]

These comments and others revealed the gang youths' somewhat different perceptions and rationale of gang war activity. There is a limited consensus of participants as to the nature of gang war situations because the gang structure—the collectivity which defines gang war behavior—is amorphous, diffuse, and malleable.

Despite the fact of gang phenomena taking a diffuse form, theoreticians, social workers, the police, the press, and the public autistically distort gangs and gang behavior toward a gestalt of clarity. The rigid frame of perceiving gangs as groups should shift to the fact of gangs as near-groups. This basic redefinition is necessary if progress is to be made in sociological diagnosis as a foundation for delinquent gang prevention and correction.

THE DETACHED GANG WORKER

The detached-worker approach to dealing with gangs on the action level is increasingly employed in large cities and urban areas throughout the country. Simply stated, a professional, usually a social worker, contacts a gang in their milieu on the street corner and attempts to redirect their delinquent patterns into constructive behavior.

Because of the absence of an adequate perceptual framework, such as the near-group concept, detached gang workers deal with gang collectivities

as if they were organized like other groups and social organizations. The following principle stated in a New York City Youth Board manual on the detached gang worker approach reveals this point of view:

Participation in a street gang or club, like participation in any natural group, is a part of the growing-up process of adolescence. Such primary group associations possess potentialities for positive growth and development. Through such a group, the individual can gain security and develop positive ways of living with other individuals. Within the structure of his group the individual can develop such characteristics as loyalty, leadership, and community responsibility (3, p. 107).

This basic misconception not only produces inaccurate reports and theories about gang structure but causes ineffectual work with gangs on the action level. This problem of projecting group structure onto gangs may be further illuminated by a cursory examination of detached gang-worker projects.

Approaching the gang as a group, when it is not, tends to project onto it a structure which formerly did not exist. The gang worker's usual set of notions about gangs as groups includes some of the following distortions: (1) the gang has a measurable number of members, (2) membership is defined, (3) the role of members is specified, (4) there is a consensus of understood gang norms among gang members, and (5) gang leadership is clear and entails a flow of authority and direction of action.

These expectations often result in a group-fulfilling prophecy. A group may form as a consequence of the gang worker's view. In one case a gang worker approached two reputed gang leaders and told them he would have a bus to take their gang on a trip to the country. This gang had limited organization; however, by travel-time there were 32 gang members ready to go on the trip. The near-group be-

came more organized as a result of the gang worker's misconception.

This gang from a near-group point of view was in reality comprised of a few disturbed youths with rich delusional systems who had need to view themselves as leaders controlling hordes of other gang boys in their fantasy. Other youths reinforce this ill-defined collectivity for a variety of personal reasons and needs. The gang, in fact, had a shifting membership, no clarity as to what membership entailed, and individualized member images of gang size and function.

The detached worker, as an agent of the formal social system, may thus move in on a gang and give a formerly amorphous collectivity structure and purpose through the projection of group structure onto a near-group.

NEAR-GROUP STRUCTURE

Research into the structure of 30 groups revealed three characteristic levels of membership organization. In the center of the gang, on the first level, are the most psychologically disturbed members—the leaders. It is these youths who require and need the gang most of all. This core of disturbed youths provides the gang's most cohesive force. In a gang of some 30 boys there may be five or six who are central or core members because they desperately need the gang in order to deal with their personal problems of inadequacy. These are youths always working to keep the gang together and in action, always drafting, plotting, and talking gang warfare. They are the center of the near-group activity.

At a second level of near-group organization in the gang, we have youths who claim affiliation to the gang but only participate in it according to their emotional needs at given times. For example, one of the Egyptian Kings reported that if his father had not given him a "bad time" and kicked him out of the house the night of the

homicide, he would not have gone to the corner and become involved in the Michael Farmer killing. This second-level gang member's participation in the gang killing was a function of his disturbance on that particular evening. This temporal gang need is a usual occurrence.

At a third level of gang participation, we have peripheral members who will join in with gang activity on occasion, although they seldom identify themselves as members of the gang at times. This type of gang member is illustrated by the youth who went along with the Egyptian Kings on the night of the Farmer killing, as he put it, "for old time's sake." He just happened to be around on that particular evening and went along due to a situational condition. He never really "belonged" to the gang nor was he defined by himself or others as a gang member.

The size of gangs is determined in great measure by the emotional needs of its members at any given point. It is not a measure of actual and live membership. Many of the members exist only on the thought level. In the gang, if the boys feel particularly hemmed in (for paranoid reasons), they will expand the number of their near-group. On the other hand, at other times when they feel secure, the gang's size is reduced to include only those youths known on a face-to-face basis. The research revealed that, unlike an actual group, no member of a near-group can accurately determine the number of its membership at a particular point in time.

For example, most any university department member will tell you the number of other individuals who comprise the faculty of their department. It is apparent that if there are eight members in a department of psychology, each member will know each other member, his role, and the total number of members of the depart-

ment. In contrast, in examining the size of gangs or near-group participation, the size increases in almost direct relationship to the lack of membership clarity. That is, the second- and third-level members are modified numerically with greater ease than the central members. Third level members are distorted at times to an almost infinite number.

In one interview, a gang leader distorted the size and affiliations of the gang as his emotional state shifted. In an hour interview, the size of his gang varied from 100 members to 4,000, from five brother gangs or alliances to 60, from about ten square blocks of territorial control to include jurisdiction over the five boroughs of New York City, New Jersey, and part of Philadelphia.

Another characteristic of the gang is its lack of role definition. Gang boys exhibit considerable difficulty and contradiction in their roles in the gang. They may say that the gang is organized for protection and that one role of a gang is to fight. How, when, whom, and for what reason he is to fight are seldom clear. The right duties and obligations associated with the gang member's role in the gang varies from gang boy to gang boy.

One gang boy may define himself as a protector of the younger boys in the neighborhood. Another defines his role in the gang as "We are going to get all those guys who call us Spics." Still other gang boys define their participation in the gang as involuntarily forced upon them, through their being "drafted." Moreover, few gang members maintain a consistent function or role within the gang organization.

Definition of membership is vague and indefinite. A youth will say he belongs one day and will quit the next without necessarily telling any other gang member. I would ask one gang boy who came into my office daily

whether he was a Balkan. This was comparable to asking him, "How do you feel today?"

Because of limited social ability to assume rights, duties, and obligations in constructive solidified groups, the gang boy attaches himself to a structure which requires limited social ability and can itself be modified to fit his monetary needs. This malleability factor is characteristic of the near-group membership. As roles are building blocks of a group, diffuse role definitions fit in adequately to the near-group which itself has diverse and diffuse objectives and goals. The near-group, unlike a true group, has norms, roles, functions, cohesion, size, and goals which are shaped by the emotional needs of its members.

GANG LEADERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS

Another aspect of near-groups is the factor of self-appointed leadership, usually of a dictatorial, authoritarian type. In interviewing hundreds of gang members one finds that many of them give themselves some role of leadership. For example, in the Egyptian Kings, approximately five boys defined themselves as "war counselors." It is equally apparent that, except on specific occasions, no one will argue with this self-defined role. Consequently, leadership in the gang may be assumed by practically any member of the gang if he so determines and emotionally needs the power of being a leader at the time. It is not necessary to have his leadership role ratified by his constituents.

Another aspect of leadership in the gang is the procedure of "drafting" or enlisting new members. In many instances, this pattern of coercion to get another youth to join or belong to the gang becomes an end in itself, rather than a means to an end. In short, the process of inducing, coercing, and threatening violence upon another youth, under the guise of getting him

to join, is an important gang leader activity. The gang boy is not truly concerned with acquiring another gang member, since the meaning of membership is vague at best; however, acting the power role of a leader forcing another youth to do something against his will becomes meaningful to the "drafter."

GANG FUNCTIONS

In most groups some function is performed or believed to be performed. The function which it performs may be a constructive one, as in an industrial organization, a P. T. A. group, or a political party. On the other hand, it may be a socially destructive group, such as a drug syndicate, a group of bookies, or a subversive political party. There is usually a consensus of objectives and goals shared by the membership, and their behavior tends to be essentially organized group action.

The structure of a near-group is such that its functions not only vary greatly and shift considerably from time to time, but its primary function is unclear. The gang may on one occasion be organized to protect the neighborhood; on another occasion, to take over a particular territory; and on still another, it may be organized in response to or for the purpose of racial discrimination.

The function of near-groups, moreover, is not one which is clearly understood, known, and communicated among all of its members. There is no consensus in this near-group of goals, objectives, or functions of the collectivity—much near-group behavior is individualistic and flows from emotional disturbance.

A prime function of the gang is to provide a channel to act out hostility and aggression to satisfy the continuing and momentary emotional needs of its members. The gang is a convenient and malleable structure quick-

ly adaptable to the needs of emotionally disturbed youths, who are unable to fulfill the responsibility and demands required for participation in constructive groups. He belongs to the gang because he lacks the social ability to relate to others and to assume responsibility for the relationship, not because the gang gives him a "feeling of belonging."

Because of the gang youth's limited "social ability," he constructs a social organization which enables him to relate and to function at his limited level of performance. In this structure norms are adjusted so that the gang youth can function and achieve despite his limited ability to relate to others.

An example of this is the function of violence in the near-group of the gang. Violence in the gang is highly valued as a means for the achievement of reputation or "rep." This inversion of societal norms is a means for quick upward social mobility in the gang. He can acquire and maintain a position in the gang through establishing a violent reputation.

The following comments by members of the Egyptian Kings illustrate this point:

If I would of got the knife, I would have stabbed him. That would have gave me more of a build-up. People would have respected me for what I've done and things like that. They would say, "There goes a cold killer."

It makes you feel like a big shot. You know some guys think they're big shots and all that. They think, you know, they got the power to do everything they feel like doing.

They say, like, "I wanna stab a guy," and the other guy says, "Oh, I wouldn't dare to do that." You know, he thinks I'm acting like a big shot. That's the way he feels. He probably thinks in his mind, "Oh, he probably won't do that." Then, when we go to a fight, you know, he finds out what I do.

Momentarily, I started to thinking about it inside: den I have my mind made up I'm not going to be in no gang.

Then I go on inside. Something comes up den here come all my friends coming to me. Like I said before, I'm intelligent and so forth. They be coming to me — then they talk to me about what they gonna do. Like, "Man, we'll go out here and kill this guy." I say, "Yeah." They kept on talkin' and talkin'. I said, "Man, I just gotta go with you." Myself, I don't want to go, but when they start talkin' about what they gonna do, I say, "So, he isn't gonna take over my rep. I ain't gonna let him be known more than me." And I go ahead just for selfishness.

The near-group of the gang, with its diffuse and malleable structure, can function as a convenient vehicle for the acting out of varied individual needs and problems. For the gang leader it can be a super-powered organization through which (in his phantasy) he dominates and controls "divisions" of thousands of members. For gang members, unable to achieve in more demanding social organizations, swift and sudden violence is a means for quick upward social mobility and the achievement of a reputation. For less disturbed youths, the gang may function as a convenient temporary escape from the dull and rigid requirements of a difficult and demanding society. These are only some of the functions the near-group of the gang performs for its membership.

NEAR-GROUP THEORY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The concept of the near-group may be of importance in the analysis of other collectivities which reflect and produce social problems. The analysis of other social structures may reveal similar distortions of their organization. To operate on an assumption that individuals in interaction with each other, around some function, with some shared mutual expectation, in a particular normative system as always being a group formation is to project a degree of distortion onto certain types of collectivities. Groups are

social structures at one end of a continuum; mobs are social structures at another end; and at the center are near-groups which have some of the characteristics of both, and yet are characterized by factors not found fully in either.

In summary, these factors may include the following:

- (1) Individualized role definition to fit momentary needs.
- (2) Diffuse and differential definitions of membership.
- (3) Emotion-motivated behavior.
- (4) A decrease of cohesiveness as one moves from the center of the collectivity to the periphery.
- (5) Limited responsibility and sociability required for membership and belonging.
- (6) Self-appointed and disturbed leadership.
- (7) A limited consensus among participants of the collectivities' functions or goals.
- (8) A shifting and personalized stratification system.
- (9) Shifting membership.
- (10) The inclusion in size of phantasy membership.
- (11) Limited consensus of normative expectations.
- (12) Norms in conflict with the inclusive social system's prescriptions.

Although the gang was the primary type of near-group appraised in this analysis, there are perhaps other collectivities whose structure is distorted by autistic observers. Their organization might become clearer if subjected to this conceptual scheme. Specifically, in the area of criminal behavior, these might very well include adult gangs varyingly called the "Mafia," the "National Crime Syndicate," and so-called International Crime Cartels. There

are indications that these social organizations are comparable in organization to the delinquent gang. They might fit the near-group category if closely analyzed in this context, rather than aggrandized and distorted by mass media and even Senate Committees.

Other more institutionalized collectivities might fit the near-group pattern. As a possible example, "the family in transition" may not be in transition at all. The family, as a social institution, may be suffering from near-groupism. Moreover, such standardized escape hatches of alcoholism, psychoses, and addictions may be too prosaic for the sophisticated intellectual to utilize in escape from himself.

For him, the creation and perpetuation of near-groups requiring limited responsibility and personal commitment may be a more attractive contemporary form for expressing social and personal pathology. The measure of organization or disorganization of an inclusive social system may possibly be assessed by the prevalence of near-group collectivities in its midst. The delinquent gang may be only one type of near-group in American society.

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CHANGES IN MORAL VALUES AS A FUNCTION OF ADULT SOCIALIZATION

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A previous study of changes in moral values over three decades reported shifts in moral judgments in relation to time factors (5). The subjects of the previous study were four groups of male and female college students, measured in 1929, 1939, and 1949, and the last in 1958. Since all the subjects in the previous study were freshmen and sophomore college students, the ages of the subjects were constant, and the changes interpreted as due to time factors.

The purpose of this paper is to report shifts in moral judgments in relation to age. The subjects consist of three groups of male and female alumni of the Ohio State University, repre-

senting a random sample of graduates from each of the following years: 1932-33, 1942-43 and 1952-53. The assumption is made that these three groups of alumni are comparable to the 1929, 1939, and 1949 freshman and sophomore college student samples insofar as childhood socialization epoch* is concerned, even though the student samples came from Northwestern and the University of Wyoming.** While the problematic nature of this

*By childhood socialization epoch is meant here the historical period during which the childhood socialization from birth to the average age of college freshmen and sophomores took place.

**The 1958 college student sample came from the Ohio State University.

assumption may limit the interpretation of the findings, it is a useful assumption since it enables the investigator to view shifts in moral value judgments in relation to age, after similar shifts in relation to childhood socialization epoch have been partialled out.

The age factor can perhaps most meaningfully be interpreted as the extent of the adult socialization process. The specific adult roles and experiences of the graduate who leaves the academic setting will most probably create changes in moral valuations. Among those experiences are separation from parental supervision, marriage and sexual activity, parenthood, economic competition, increased political involvement, the establishment of more permanent friendship ties, membership in voluntary associations, and later, menopause, separation from children, and perhaps, the retrospective evaluation of the achievement of one's goals and purposes in life. It is these and other experiences which constitute the adult socialization process and which may be referred to as the age factor.*

Does the increased conservatism, which presumably accompanies the adult socialization process, extend itself across different spheres of behavior or is it confined to the political-economic aspects of life? Do religious sanctions become more or less severe with increased age? Does the individual human life become more precious or less precious to the older person? What is the relationship between age and corporate and collective morality in a middle class sample? These and other questions are under scrutiny in this report. Since existing

prior information in this area was insufficient for the prediction of such changes when childhood socialization epoch is controlled, no formal hypotheses are tested in the presentation of the data.

METHOD

To make the present data comparable to those obtained in the previous study the identical questionnaire, consisting of 50 morally prohibited activities, was mailed in 1958 to 2400 alumni of the Ohio State University. Each respondent was asked to judge each activity in terms of "rightness" or "wrongness" from 1 (least wrong or not wrong at all) to 10 (most wrong or "wrongest" possible). The alumni were randomly chosen from the files of the Ohio State University Alumni Association according to three periods of graduation: 1932-33, 1942-43, and 1952-53. Each period was represented by 400 male and 400 female alumni (two hundred for each year and sex). Of all the questionnaires returned after two appeals, 1742 (73 per cent) were actually usable in reporting the present results. The separate male and female returns of each period ranged from 274 (male 1952-53) to 307 (females 1932-33), hence the frequency of returns for each sex and in each period are very similar. Of the alumni used, 87 per cent are married, 78 per cent have one or more child, and 61 per cent are still living in Ohio. While the actual ages were not recorded, the average age of the 1932-33 sample is estimated at about fifty years, that of the 1942-43 sample at about forty years, and that of the 1952-53 sample at about thirty years.

The mean severity ratings of each sample were converted into ranks, ranging from least bad or not bad at all (rank 1) to worst or "wrongest" possible (rank 50).** Since the num-

*It must be realized, however, that the adult socialization process also takes place in an historical setting. For example, marriage or parenthood during the depression or during World War II is not the same experience as marriage or parenthood in the contemporary atomic age.

**This procedure is identical with that used in the study of changes in moral values in college students (5).

ber of male and female alumni in each category is not identical, all values were adjusted so as to equalize the proportion of males and females.

Following the calculation of ranks of the alumni data, the previously obtained ranks of the various student samples were subtracted from the alumni ranks so as to obtain the differences in ranks between the alumni and students of the same period. That is, the ranks of the 1929 student sample were subtracted from the ranks of the 1932-33 alumni sample, the ranks of the 1939 students sample were subtracted from the ranks of the 1942-43 alumni sample, and the ranks of the 1949 student sample were subtracted from the 1952-53 alumni sample. This procedure is intended to partial out shifts in moral value judgments which are due to different childhood socialization epochs so as to reflect changes in moral values that are a function only of different stages in the adult socialization process.*

RESULTS

Patterns of Change

The following patterns of change were discerned. Items falling into each of these patterns may be found in Table 1.

*The average moral judgment of the previously studied student samples which were constant in age but observed at different points in time varied by 6.5 ranks (5). The average unadjusted judgment of the groups presently under investigation, differing in age but observed at the same time period, changes its position by 5 ranks. Since the present judgments are not very much closer to one another than those of the student samples it can not be assumed that the characteristic moral climate of any particular era is operative. With the variability of judgment more or less equal in both studies it can be assumed that the changes resulting from the subtraction of the student ranks from those of the alumni can be primarily ascribed to the varying degrees of the adult socialization process. Shortage of space does not permit the separate tabulation of the unadjusted rank judgments. However, the rank judgments of the student samples can be found in (5).

1. *Decrease in severity of moral judgment.* This pattern appears if the rank differences between alumni and college students decrease with increased age.

2. *Increase in severity of moral judgment.* This pattern appears if the rank differences increase with increased age.

3. *World War II bump.* The World War II hump consists of a sudden rise in severity of judgment in the 1942-43 alumni sample, so that the gap in ranks between these alumni and the 1939 college students is positive in an otherwise decreasing and negative pattern. Here it must be remembered that World War II and the following war draft took place between the time the college students were measured in 1939 and the graduation of college students in 1942-43.

4. *Stability.* Stability is indicated if the rank differences do not vary by more than two or three positions over the years.

Items that do not fall into any of the above patterns vary inconsistently (pattern 5).

Thirteen items fall into pattern 1 (decrease in severity of moral judgments). Inspection of the declining items reveals that three of these items pertain to sexual morality (items 16, 3, and 48), four items relate to corporate morality (items 7, 18, 29, and 42), and two items relate to status striving (items 50 and 14). Two additional items (47 and 20) indicate a decrease in social morality. Item 35 pertains to social parasitism.** In at least seven of the declining items an economic motive can be discerned. It appears, therefore, that there is an inverse relationship between adult socialization on the one hand and eco-

**The remaining item in pattern 1, item 13, is related to other items pertaining to offenses against children (item 2 and 8) in the discussion and must be considered with them.

TABLE 1
MORAL VALUE CHANGES AS A FUNCTION OF AGE
PATTERN 1, DECREASE IN SEVERITY OF JUDGEMENT (IN RANKS)

| Item | 1952-1953 | | Alumni 1942-1943 | | 1932-1933 | |
|--|-----------|--------------|------------------|----------|-----------|--------|
| | N | Equals | N | Equals | N | Equals |
| | 1958 | 1949 | 1939 | 1929 | | |
| | Students | Less College | Students | Students | | |
| | N | N | N | N | | |
| | 489 | 591 | 553 | 295 | | |
| (16) Having illicit sex relations after marriage | 0 | — 6 | — 9 | —14 | | |
| (3) Having sex relations while unmarried | 0 | — 2 | — 7.5 | —10 | | |
| (48) A man deserting a girl whom he has got into trouble without himself taking responsibility | 0 | — 9 | —11 | —10.5 | | |
| (47) Slipping out secretly and going among people when one's home is under quarantine for a contagious disease | 0 | 0 | —12.5 | —10 | | |
| (7) An industry maintaining working conditions for its workers known to be detrimental to their health | 0 | — 6 | — 7.5 | — 9 | | |
| (18) A prosperous industry paying workers less than a living wage | 0 | —11.5 | — 9 | —13 | | |
| (29) Charging interest above a fair rate when lending money | 0 | — 1 | 1 | — 7 | | |
| (35) Living on inherited wealth without attempting to render service to others | 0 | — 1 | 0 | — 7 | | |
| (42) Misrepresenting the value of an investment in order to induce credulous persons to invest | 0 | — 1 | — 1 | — 4 | | |
| (50) A man not marrying a girl he loves because she is markedly his inferior socially and in education | 0 | —16 | —13 | — 7 | | |
| (14) Living beyond one's means in order to possess luxuries enjoyed by friends and associates | 0 | — 2 | — 4 | — 1 | | |
| (20) Not giving to charity when able | 0 | — 6 | — 4 | — 6 | | |
| (13) A jury freeing a father who has killed a man for rape against his young daughter | 0 | 0 | — 2 | — 4 | | |

PATTERN 2, INCREASE IN SEVERITY OF JUDGMENT

| | | | | |
|--|---|-------|-----|-----|
| (19) Holding up and robbing a person | 0 | 1 | 5 | 11 |
| (4) Forging a check | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| (2) Kidnaping and holding a child for ransom | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| (45) A man having a vacant building he cannot rent sets it on fire to collect insurance | 0 | 11 | 8 | 12 |
| (10) Testifying falsely in court when under oath | 0 | 8 | 6 | 11 |
| (5) Habitually failing to keep promises | 0 | — 2 | 0 | 4 |
| (49) Disbelieving in God | 0 | — 2.5 | — 1 | 12 |
| (39) Seeking amusement on Sunday instead of going to church | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| (25) Not giving to support religion when able | 0 | — 2 | 1 | 6 |
| (43) Taking money for one's vote in an election | 0 | 1 | 6.5 | 8.5 |
| (34) Depositing more than one ballot in an election in order to aid a favorite candidate | 0 | 6 | 5 | 4 |
| (21) Not taking the trouble to vote at primaries and elections | 0 | 0 | 8 | 1 |
| (9) A legislator, for a financial consideration, using his influence to secure the passage of a law known to be contrary to public interest | 0 | 7 | 11 | 6 |
| (23) Falsifying about a child's age to secure reduced fare | 0 | 8 | 9 | 8 |
| (26) Keeping over-change given by a clerk in mistake | 0 | 8.5 | 2 | 9 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (36) Taking one's own life (assuming no near relative or dependents): | 0 | 2 | 7 | 3 |
| (8) A doctor allowing a badly deformed baby to die when he could save its life but not cure its deformity | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 |

PATTERN 3, SPECIFIC INCREASE IN SEVERITY OF JUDGMENT IN
1942-1943 ALUMNI SAMPLE

| | | | | |
|--|---|----|-----|------|
| (12) A nation dealing unjustly with a weaker nation over which it has power | 0 | -1 | 5.5 | -2 |
| (46) Nations at war using poison gas on the homes and cities of its enemy behind the lines | 0 | -2 | 5 | -7.5 |
| (30) Falsifying a federal income tax return | 0 | -1 | 3 | -2 |

PATTERN 4, STABILITY IN SEVERITY OF JUDGMENT

| | | | | |
|--|---|----|----|----|
| (22) A strong commercial concern selling below cost to crowd out a weaker competitor | 0 | -2 | 0 | -1 |
| (24) A student who is allowed to grade his own paper reporting a higher grade than the one earned | 0 | 0 | -1 | -2 |
| (28) Speeding away after one's car knocks down a pedestrian | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| (32) Married persons using birth-control devices | 0 | -1 | -2 | -1 |
| (33) Seeking divorce because of incompatibility when both parties agree to separate (assuming no children) | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| (37) Using profane or blasphemous speech | 0 | -1 | -2 | -1 |
| (40) Refusing to bear arms in a war one believes to be unjust | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| (41) Advertising a medicine to cure a disease known to be incurable by such a remedy | 0 | 1 | -1 | 0 |

PATTERN 5, IRREGULAR FLUCTUATION OF SEVERITY OF JUDGMENT

| | | | | |
|--|---|-----|----|------|
| (1) Killing a person in defense of one's own life | 0 | 2 | -1 | -3 |
| (6) Girls smoking cigarettes | 0 | -3 | -4 | 0 |
| (11) Betting on horse races | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| (15) Bootlegging under prohibition law | 0 | 5 | 3 | -1.5 |
| (17) Driving an automobile while drunk but without accident | 0 | 4.5 | -1 | 4 |
| (27) Copying from another's paper in a school examination | 0 | 2 | -1 | 3 |
| (31) Buying bootleg liquor under prohibition law | 0 | 5 | .5 | -4 |
| (38) Being habitually cross or disagreeable to members of one's own family | 0 | -5 | -2 | .5 |
| (44) Newspapers treating crime news so as to make hoodlums and gangsters appear heroic | 0 | -1 | -5 | 4.5 |

nomic, social, and sexual morality on the other hand. Of particular interest in these and other comparisons is the difference in moral valuations between the 1958 college student sample and the 1932-33 alumni sample which represents the parental generation of the 1958 students. With childhood socialization epoch controlled, the great gap between the 1958 students

and the 1932-33 alumni appears to be a genuine function of age.

Pattern 2 (increase in severity of moral judgments) includes seventeen items. The first five items pertain to crime and include robbery, forgery, kidnaping, and perjury. Three items indicate a rise in religious morality (items 49, 39, and 25). Four additional items show a rise in political

morality (items 43, 34, 21, and 9). The last two items relate to the sanctity of human life (suicide and mercy killing). Of the three remaining items, two pertain to puritanical morality items 23, and 26) and one relates to exploitative-manipulative morality (item 5). Here it must be remembered that item 4 (forging a check) and item 5 (not keeping promises) have the highest loadings on the exploitative-manipulative morality factor. This factor was tentatively also identified as an indicator of pre-delinquent morality (6). From these findings it appears, therefore, that with increased age there is an increase in anti-criminal morality, in religious morality, in political moral responsibility, and in the sanctity of the individual human life.

Pattern 3, World War II hump, includes three items. Two of these items (12 and 46) relate to war and can be classified as collective morality since the responsibility for the action cannot be ascribed to an individual actor, nor is the recipient of the action a single individual (7). The pattern described here, however, should not be identified with pacifism (see item 40, pattern 4). Item 30 pertains to income tax evasion. The present pattern indicates a heightened collective moral responsibility involving the government in the forty-year old, 1932-33 alumni.

Eight items show remarkable stability over the years (pattern 4). These include the use of birth control devices, divorce, hit-and-run, pacifism, false medical claims, unfair competition, and betrayal of trust. Two of these items (birth control and hit-and-run) show great stability possibly because of the extreme position they occupy (low and high respectively).

Nine items do not seem to fall into any consistent pattern of change. Most of these items, however, relate to relatively superficial or outdated moral

issues, such as self-defense, betting, bootlegging, girls smoking cigarettes, cheating in school, and disagreeableness with one's own family.

DISCUSSION

In interpreting the findings certain methodological limitations must be kept in mind. Since the computations of ranks is a relative process, the obtained ranks cannot be interpreted as absolute values. Furthermore, the subtraction of one set of ranks (time changes in students) from another set of ranks (time and age changes in alumni) and the interpretation of the obtained rank differences as age changes may be mathematically a questionable procedure, especially since this method of rank differences ignores changes due to time-age interaction. However, here it must be taken into consideration that the individual college student data from 1929, 1939, and 1949 are not available any more. Hence, more efficient statistical methods for the analysis of the data could not be utilized.*

The present investigators are making the assumption that three major variables are responsible for moral value changes: the specific childhood socialization epoch, the extent of the adult socialization process, and the contemporary setting. The contemporary setting is constant for all Ohio samples of this study, since they were all measured in 1958. Changes in moral values in alumni are a function of both the different childhood socialization epochs and the different extent of the adult socialization process. Changes in moral values due to differences in specific childhood socializa-

*The most efficient statistic, which could control for changes due to time factors, would be analysis of co-variance. However, the individual data of the various college student samples which are necessary for such analysis were gathered by Crissman (2; 3). These data are no longer in existence (personal communication).

tion epochs were obtained in a previous study of college students and were partialled out from the value changes of the alumni. Hence, the shifts in moral values obtained in this study are presumed to be due to the different extent of the adult socialization process only (disregarding interaction between childhood socialization epoch and extent of adult socialization). The information in Table 1, therefore, relates not to crude changes in moral value severity, but to that portion of moral value change which is due to the different extent of the adult socialization process.

In light of the previous discussion, it can be stated that increased adult socialization seems to be accompanied by increased moral leniency in economic and sexual spheres of activity and in social responsibility. This trend appears to be particularly strong and consistent with respect to sexual moral issues and with respect to those economic issues which represent moral violations on the part of industry toward labor. A decline in corporate morality from 1929 to the present also appeared in the study of college students. However, the decline in corporate morality among the alumni remains consistent even when the extent of adult socialization is not controlled for the different childhood socialization epochs (e.g., when the student data are not subtracted from the alumni data, item 18 went from rank 37 in the 1958 male college student sample to rank 29 in the 1932-33 male alumni sample, and item 7 changed consistently from 41 to 34; females show similar changes). This consistent decline in corporate morality may be an indication of increasing political conservatism and economic security in the older alumni. It is clear that the alumni are more likely to hold supervisory and managerial positions in industry than positions associated with manual labor. Hence, the increased leniency

in corporate morality appears to be a direct function of the adult socialization process of the college graduate.

Perhaps the most surprising finding in this study is the consistently increasing leniency in sexual morality with increased adult socialization. Here it must be remembered that only the married person is apt to be exposed, directly or indirectly, to the practice of adultery. The increased leniency toward pre-marital sex may reflect an increasing tendency to idealize youth and romantic elements with increasing age (4). The freshmen or sophomore college student, because of lack of experience and because of ignorance, tends to adhere to the ideal moral norms of our culture. It is in the sexual area in which the college student will perhaps experience the greatest degree of discontinuity with increased adult socialization. (The reader may notice the sudden drop in severity of judgment from the '58 students to the thirty-year old alumni in items 16 and 48 but not in item 3). Since the college students showed little change in sexual morality over the years, the decreased sexual morality among the alumni appears to be solely a function of adult socialization.*

The adult socialization period is also accompanied by an increase in moral responsibility in politics, towards religion, crime, and toward individual human life. Since the college students showed similar increases in severity of moral judgments in these areas since 1929, the trends in increased moral responsibility among the alumni become apparent only when the changes among college students are partialled

*With the alumni data uncontrolled for socialization epoch, the condemnation of pre-marital sex still decreased consistently from rank 34 in the '58 female college students to rank 19 in the female 1932-33 alumni. The condemnation of adultery decreased consistently from 44 to 33 among males and from 48 to 36 among females.

out from the alumni data. Here it must be kept in mind that an increase in severity of judgment from 1929 to the present among college students is mathematically the reverse of an increase in severity of judgment with increased age, 1958 to 1932-33. It is here that control for childhood socialization epoch is most useful in realizing trends not immediately apparent from the crude data.

The increase in religious values is more pronounced in the oldest group of alumni than in the younger groups. In fact the younger groups show a slight decrease in severity of judgment. It seems, therefore, that the increase in religious values is specific to those fifty years old and over. The findings on the increased religious moral values in the older person in this study correspond to similar findings on the increased religious interests of older people, 60 years and older, in a study conducted ten years ago (1). The previous authors also found a rise in the belief in an afterlife which reached 100 per cent by the nineties, for both men and women. These findings were related to the increasing demand for a feeling of security which presumably was derived from religious activities. Interestingly enough the increase in the condemnation of suicide and mercy killing is less pronounced in the older alumni. Perhaps the motives underlying suicidal behavior and mercy killing are better understood by the older person. The condemnation of crime increases most consistently with age. Perhaps the older the person becomes the more he tends to see himself as the victim rather than the aggressor in crime. The older the person the more property he tends to have, and the greater his family responsibility becomes. Hence, his ethical code against crime increases in severity.

The increase in political moral responsibility with increased adult so-

cialization is to be expected since the forty or fifty year old person is more often directly affected by the outcome of an election. Furthermore, he is more often a member in various voluntary associations and pressure groups which are fighting for political causes. One would speculate, however, that this increase in political responsibility will be followed by a decrease in older age, since the person above a certain age will tend to withdraw from political life and voluntary group memberships (1). This speculation is partially supported by the data, since in three out of four items dealing with moral violations in the political areas there is a decline in severity of judgment in the oldest alumni sample.

Three items in the questionnaire bear upon offenses against children (items 2, 8, and 13). As is to be expected all three items change toward the increased condemnation of offenses against a child or the increased acceptance of defending one's child. Needless to state, the role and experience of parenthood may directly affect this change.

Of particular interest is the sudden rise of collective moral responsibility in the 1942-43 alumni sample. It seems that the students who were not drafted immediately at the beginning of World War II, but remained to complete their studies before joining the Armed Forces are characterized today, over 15 years later, by a heightened feeling of responsibility towards government. Whether this is the lasting effect of the direct war experience, or simply a selective factor of those who remained in college cannot, of course, be ascertained in this study.* With the exception of this particular group of alumni there is a tendency for collective moral responsibility to

*It is of interest to note that the 1942-43 alumni, many of whom directly experienced the "police action" in Korea, do not show such a rise in collective morality.

decrease with increased adult socialization. Here it must be remembered that the older person is less apt to be directly affected by a war draft. Furthermore, the thirty year old and fifty year old alumni, most of whom experienced World War II at home because of the age factor, were not exposed to the use of poison gas on their homes and cities nor was the United States subjugated to a stronger nation.

In conclusion, the essential thesis underlying this report that the adult socialization process creates changes in moral valuations is supported by the data. It is realized that the samples used in this study are predominantly middle class, and come from the Midwest region of the United States. Furthermore, the age is restricted to a range of 20 to 50 years. Generalizations as to different social classes, different geographical regions, and different age ranges can only be made with great caution. But perhaps the most important limitation of this study is the restriction of the adult socialization process in this study to specific historical settings, the effects of which were not specified. It is highly probable that the adult roles and experiences in the generations to come will differ considerably from

those that took place during the depression and during World War II. Unless the effects of such historical settings are taken into account in evaluating the adult socialization process, predictions about future changes in moral values with age will indeed be very limited.

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WORK AS A "CENTRAL LIFE INTEREST" OF PROFESSIONALS*

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Robert Dubin's study of the "central life interests" of industrial work-

*This is part of a larger program of current research which analyzes and compares the role orientations of members of different professions. It is carried on with the support of the University of Wisconsin Graduate Research Committee and with a grant from the Wisconsin Department of Nurses.

ers concluded that work and the workplace do not generally constitute important foci of concern for this group (2). As Dubin suggests, his study calls for replication with equivalent groups. It would seem desirable in addition to replicate with other components of the labor force. Our knowledge of the professions and of the

pattern of commitment by professionals to work-centered goals is extensive.* This knowledge leads to the prediction that professionals would stress work and workplace as preferred locations for a variety of activities. Hence, work is more likely to be a "central life interest" for professionals than it is for industrial workers. This paper reports the results of an attempt to verify this prediction.

CATEGORIES OF WORK AND NON-WORK EXPERIENCES

Dubin reports four sub-patterns within the general finding. He classified experiences into the following categories: informal group participation; general activities which furnish personal satisfactions; involvement in formal organizations; and technological behavior.

Concerning informal social relations, Dubin found that a small minority of his subjects preferred to have their informal group life and social participation centered on the job. A parallel finding applied to personal satisfactions: industrial workers derive these from non-work connected experiences and relationships rather than from situations involving their work roles. Dubin contends, on the basis of these findings, that work is necessary for industrial workers but is "not valued" by them.

A related assertion is that individuals' attachments to nonvalued but mandatory situations, such as work, will be "... to the most physically and directly obvious characteristics of that situation." He then predicted that "... a significant proportion of industrial workers will score job-oriented for their [formal] organizational experiences" and for their experiences with technological aspects of their environment. His data generally bear out these predictions.

*See, for example, (1).

PROFESSIONALS' PATTERNS

It can hardly be assumed that professionals do not value their work. They may in fact consider it an end-in-itself. For the professional, work is a focal center of self-identification and is both important and valued. Thus, we predict that professionals will be much more favorably oriented to work as a "central life interest" than are industrial workers.

Training as a professional may stress technological details as well as the learning of behaviors appropriate to future roles in work settings. Such training also encourages aspirants to professional status to prefer a work setting to other settings for the location of informal social relationships and as sources of personal satisfactions; these, however, are not as readily codified for transmission during training as are technology and prescriptions involving organization roles. At most, preferences for work rather than non-work settings as the environment for informal social relationships and for general personal satisfactions may be considered to be probable, if unintended, consequences of necessary segregation during training. Preferences of this sort are not the planned outcome of specific curricular features.

From these considerations, we expect the pattern among the four components of experiences which Dubin reported for industrial workers to be duplicated with professionals. Professionals will be quite likely to prefer the environment of the workplace as the setting for technological and organizational experiences. They will to a lesser degree locate informal social relationships and general personal satisfactions within the arena of work. In all four sectors, however, professionals should weight work settings more heavily than they weight non-work settings.

SOURCES AND METHODS

Questionnaires which contained Du-

bin's "central life interest" items were administered to registered professional nurses employed in public and private general hospitals and a state mental hospital in a midwestern city.* The cooperation of these institutions and of the registry organization of nurses employed on private duty in them was obtained. In all, 150 professional nurses completed questionnaires.

Scoring procedures were identical with those reported by Dubin, both for the calculation of the total pattern and for the sub-patterns. Results deriving from professional nurses, as well as those from Dubin's sample of industrial workers, are presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1
TOTAL "CENTRAL LIFE INTERESTS"
AND SUBORDINATE EXPERIENCE
PATTERNS, FOR PROFESSIONAL
NURSES (ORZACK) AND INDUSTRIAL
WORKERS (DUBIN)

| Pattern | Professional Nurses (Orzack) Per Cent | Industrial Workers (Dubin) Per Cent |
|--|--|--|
| Total "Central Life Interest" | | |
| Work | 79 | 24 |
| Non-work | 21 | 76 |
| Informal Relations | | |
| Work | 45 | 9 |
| Non-work | 55 | 91 |
| General Relations (Personal Satisfaction) | | |
| Work | 67 | 15 |
| Non-work | 33 | 85 |
| Formal Organization Relations | | |
| Work | 91 | 61 |
| Non-work | 9 | 39 |
| Technological Relations | | |
| Work | 87 | 63 |
| Non-work | 13 | 37 |
| N | 150 | 491 |

RESULTS

The most provocative finding concerns the total pattern. Dubin re-

*Some minor changes in wording were necessary. Industrial terms, such as "the plant," were replaced by terms appropriate to the organizations where these nurses are employed. Otherwise, the instrument was the same as that used by Dubin.

ported that "... for almost three out of every four industrial workers studied, work and the workplace *are not* central life interests." In contrast, for four of every five nurses studied, work and the workplace *are* central life interests. We may infer that these professional nurses are much more interested in their work than Dubin's factory workers were in theirs.

The responses for the four sub-categories of experiences support in the main the relevant hypotheses. Informal social relations as well as general sources of personal satisfactions are less likely to be work or job-centered than are experiences involving participation in formal organization and technological behaviors. Professional nurses weight work settings more heavily than they weight non-work settings, with one exception: informal relations are somewhat more closely linked with non-work and community locations than is the case for general personal satisfactions. Nurses are overwhelmingly likely to prefer work to non-work or community settings for their technological behavior and for their participation in formal organizations.

The responses of these professional nurses regarding the preferred centers of informal social relations and the preferred sources of personal satisfactions are interesting. Some 45 per cent of the respondents express a preference for work as the environment for informal social relations, with the remainder choosing non-work. About two thirds select work as the preferred source of personal satisfactions, with one third reporting that non-work sources are preferred for these satisfactions.

The relations between these are complicated and deserve further scrutiny. It might be expected that informal social relationships, probably primary group memberships, would furnish the individual with lasting

personal satisfactions. However, many of these respondents locate their sources of personal satisfactions in environments other than those which they prefer for informal social relationships. In Table 2, the respondents' choices of work and non-work locations for the two items under consideration are cross-tabulated. Almost 60 per cent select the same locations for both; of this group, virtually two

TABLE 2

WORK AND NON-WORK CHOICES
FOR INFORMAL GROUP EXPERIENCES
AND GENERAL SOURCES OF
PERSONAL SATISFACTIONS, BY
PROFESSIONAL NURSES

| Informal Group Experiences | Sources of Personal Satisfactions | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| | Work | Non-work | N |
| Work | 53 (35%) | 14 (9%) | 67 |
| Non-work | 48 (32%) | 35 (23%) | 83 |
| N | 101 | 49 | 150 (100%) |

fifths indicate that their greatest personal satisfactions and most preferred informal group experiences come to them outside the environment of work. Clearly, these are professionals whose outlook on their work can be expected to be somewhat distinctive. This outlook might stress what Habenstein and Christ have called the "utilizer" orientation toward a professional role (3). Neither the pro-science and technique-committed "professionalizer" nor the warm-hearted "traditionalizer" could readily be expected to have such a perspective. These responses might be typical of professionals who are not engrossed in the area of work in any fundamental sense.

Somewhat similar problems arise in connection with the two other groups of nurses. One third of all nurse respondents indicate they prefer work as the setting from which they derive personal satisfactions, while preferring

non-work locations for their informal group participation. Nine per cent of the nurses make the opposite choices: they prefer work for informal group experiences, and non-work for their personal satisfactions. Thus, among these nurses with "deviant" orientations, the number who prefer work-centered personal satisfactions but non-work centered informal group experiences is roughly three and one half times as great as those who prefer the alternate locations for their satisfactions and group experiences.

Training as a professional may be expected to instill rather deeply-felt motivations toward personal satisfactions in work activities. However, the sense of collegueship might not be as fully developed or intensified in nursing as in other professions. For many, nursing is simply back-stop protection against the hazards of widowhood, aging or spinsterhood. These professionals might be expected to have extensive memberships in what they would define as non-work groups, including their families and neighborhood associations. For many with tenuous commitments to nursing, the appeal of those memberships could far outweigh the significance of colleagues.

These non-professional memberships may levy diffuse demands upon the individuals involved; the appropriate role behavior for them is learned gradually and usually unwittingly. In contrast, colleague groups demand patterned and specified behaviors; the associated roles are achieved through specialized instruction during a limited time span. The kinds of overlapping commitments to non-work groups and to colleague groups for this profession, at least, can be clarified by the results given above. Specialized training produces an individual with particular technological skills who has been taught to find the work rewarding and satisfying. At the

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same time, the profession does not have appeals sufficient to outweigh role obligations required by non-professional groups in which its members participate.

Such a pattern may be especially characteristic of professions with many females. The critical feature is the transiency of the professionals and the limited commitment that ties the person with the specialty. Or, the pattern might be characteristic of work specialties which have not achieved full status as professions. This implies that the ability of an aspirant profession to dominate the behavior of its members is not firmly established.

Low turnover, and the regular and persistent pursuit of occupationally-specified careers, are among the conditions that must exist for thriving loyalties to specialized occupations and professions. Without question, these are less characteristic of nursing than of most professions, or, indeed, of many crafts. In common with many other fields of work, the demand for increased technological specialization in nursing may in fact alienate the professional and limit the scope of felt rewards to personal satisfactions from technical achievements.

DISCUSSION

Dubin's major hypothesis was that work roles are assigned merely segmental importance in our society and that work is only one competing area of socially-patterned personal identifications. Hence, he concluded, work may be but little valued by labor-force participants. The results reported here suggest that his generalizations need amplification. At least in terms of the technique employed in this study, work appears to be a major, if not dominant, interest of the professional nurses who constituted our sample.

It remains to be seen whether other professionals, for example, in a field which is predominantly male, or in

fields which typically involve independent practice, such as optometry (5) or dentistry, reveal different patterns of preference for work locations. Unlike nursing, a dominant feature of such fields is the separation of work from a large organizational setting. The professional may work regularly with others such as receptionists and aides, both of whom he considers to be sub-professional. These are co-workers but not colleagues. At the end of a fatiguing work day, the professional optometrist or dentist may well prefer to relax with other people who are neither his non-professional work associates nor his professional peers. Responses to the "central life interest" inventory by these independent professionals might, as a consequence, show much less orientation to work than was evidenced by nurses.

Study of persons affiliated with other professions whose traditions do not stress independence from large organizations would provide an additional check on the results. Accountability, where the major options appear to be employment in a department of a large corporation or affiliation with an accounting firm, or teaching, would be good examples of professions whose work occurs in organizational settings. In accounting, however, an historic ideal of independence has been taken over from the traditional ideology of small business ownership. Clinical psychology and social work are illustrative of the aspirant professions that have been tied in with organizational settings and have flourished and expanded in recent years as a direct result. A third interesting possibility is medicine, where hospitals provide large-scale settings for work. At the same time, that profession self-consciously asserts the independence of its members through the maintenance of separate offices, the vesting, in the hands of the medical societies, of critical power over hospitals, and the

continuation of separate billing for professional services within hospitals.

Each of these several professions would be expected to have a somewhat different pattern. Medicine and accountancy have in common some tradition of independence in work. Accountancy appears to be less tenacious than medicine in using that tradition as the basis for the image of itself which it projects to the public. However, specialists in both fields usually perform their work in large and complicated organizational environments. It is probable that the unusual status concerns of physicians, coupled with their prestige and income, would result in a greater acceptance of work as a "central life interest" by them than by accountants.

In contrast, clinical psychology and social work have flourished within the context of large organizational settings and without the tradition of independence. Because of their fields' recent and very rapid growth, practitioners riding upon the success of these specialties might be expected to have intensive commitments to work and to their profession. Psychologists and social workers might be expected to show a greater concern for work than specialists in fields that have been stable for a longer period of time.

It may be appropriate to agree with Dubin's speculations that "the sense of attachment" to social organizations is a very important key to the understanding of contemporary industrial relations. For industrial workers, pride in work and in occupation may be less the center of personal identification than is pride in the organizations within the community to which they belong. In contrast to industrial workers, professionals still consider work and workplace as important and valued centers of their activity. Social relations within work settings are salient for professionals. Their specialized and prolonged training encourages the

development of a commitment to work and to their professional community.

For industrial workers, mobility within the plant may mean a change from one level or type of job responsibility to another. Status within the factory implies interchangeability. Individuals cannot move easily from one profession to another, and advancements in rank as a professional generally involve merely a higher degree of responsibility in the same area of work. Within health institutions, however, the emerging emphasis on the "health team" may ultimately lead to the blurring of the separate identities of the participants from several related professions. The long-run consequence may be the loss by the individual professions of what Everett Hughes calls their licence and mandate (4). If that occurs, one outcome may be the reduction in the professional's attachment to his profession and the rise in his attachment to the organization which furnishes employment as well as to groups outside the field of work. The pattern reported here may then be replaced, in part at least, by that reported by Dubin.

It is not surprising to find that many professionals prefer to derive their personal satisfactions from work and workplace. This is a component of the emerging self-concept encouraged during training, if not specifically dictated by it. Nor is it surprising to find that a greater proportion of professionals than of industrial workers prefer work as locus for informal social relations. Results for the items on technological behavior and participation in formal organizations are also in accord with the hypotheses. Organizations are critical features of the work lives of many professionals. These professional nurses structure formal organizational activity in terms of their work behaviors. Knowledge of the range of controls which con-

strain these nurses makes this result expected. Further, the emphasis during training and post-training stresses the learning and repetition of certain behaviors and activities considered to be at the core of the profession itself. Technological behaviors such as are covered in the questionnaire are not excluded in socialization for non-work roles but are obviously not important as a component of them.

In the final analysis, the "central life interest" inventory is a measure of values. When it is used to compare professionals and industrial workers, we learn something about the values of these groups. The professional nurses studied here, in contrast to Dublin's industrial workers, do have an over-riding preference for work. However, it is not merely technology and competence in dealing with the technological components of the field that binds the professional to his work. The total value commitment by professionals is shown in the greater tendency for professionals than for industrial workers to situate informal group experiences, personal satisfactions and formal organization attachments within the work environment.

As the movement of specialties toward professionalization continues, and as more technical specialties make claims as professions, we might suppose that work will have greater implications for the performance of non-work roles. It might be argued that the more highly organized and professionalized such fields become, the more frequent will be the tendency for work roles to create demands that affect the patterning of non-work activities. Such demands may, however, slacken off as the specialty nears the professional model, and as the professionals can afford, in consequence, to relax.

Perhaps this can be the explanation for the 21 per cent of the nurses who

did not portray work as a central life interest. These are the individuals who are unlikely to be dedicated professionals. This could be because of marital responsibilities, or beliefs that they will not remain within the field. However, the deviants may reflect upon a characteristic of the professional community in another sense. As mentioned above, professional fields may well vary in their capacity to have non-work roles of their specialists influenced by work requirements and professional obligations. The ability of these fields to constrain the behaviors of their participants may vary. Nursing as a field is apparently moving toward increased professionalization. The result may be increased constraint upon those who remain in the field, and as a consequent reduction in the amount of deviancy tolerated.

The differences between Dublin's findings for industrial workers and the current findings for professional nurses imply a greater commitment to work by these and perhaps other professionals. Many facets of the professionals' lives are affected by the nature of their work and the extent of their commitment to it and to their places of work. Work is obviously a highly-valued, demanding and important feature of the many roles played in our society by professionals.

The professionals for whom work is a central life interest (not including lawyers) may consider participation in voluntary associations to be incompatible with their work obligations and an active involvement in community decision-making as an inappropriate and unnecessary use of time. Thus, they may withdraw or remain neutral on political issues. Such a disengagement can affect the level of public morality, as social power goes by default to others. In turn, sectors of the public may distrust the detached professionals and acutely resent even a rare venture into civic affairs. This

view of professionals accompanies the belief that they ought to persist "until the work is done;" they *should* work more and harder than others; their satisfactions are not supposed to be primarily monetary. The underpayment of professionals, especially in fields where their associations do not significantly affect career entry or influence conditions of work, is a logical outcome.

Two circumstances suggest counterbalancing trends. One is the levelling effect on work roles of ubiquitous large-scale formal organizations. The contemporary professional is increasingly an "organization man," subject to job standardization procedures, personnel policies, and other structural coercions. His degree of participation in public matters may be much like that of other types of "organization man;" he may be resented as a member of the larger category of white collar workers, technicians and specialists. Second, professionals with deviant orientations to work may most readily come to the public's attention. The public may generalize to all professionals and believe them to be not very different from other categories of workers.

The outcomes of this study demonstrate the fruitfulness of re-casting generalizations derived from the study of particular groups as hypotheses for further research under changed conditions. One prospective possibility is to duplicate the technique used in this and in Dubin's study with other work groups, thereby broadening our knowledge of the several ways in which participation in and commitments to work and work activity may affect the other role behaviors of occupational and professional specialists.

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OCCUPATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF LOWER CLASS NEGRO AND WHITE YOUTH*

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This paper presents the summarized results and a post hoc explanation of the findings of a pilot study on the

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occupational aspirations of Negro and white youth of *similar low economic status*. The study grew out of the desire of a local Mayor's Committee on Human Relations to conduct an action program designed to assist Negro

youth in overcoming the handicaps of their minority status. Our discussion deals primarily with the aspirations of these youth.

Previous studies (4; 6; 7; 8; 9) — and particularly that of Volney Faw (3) in Chicago — have indicated a stress by Negro youngsters on the professions and other white collar positions as their choice for a job future. These studies, however, made no attempt to explain this striking finding, to delineate the process by which Negro youngsters make their choices. Their findings become all the more intriguing when we realize that the generally known bases for high occupational choice — middle class parents, broad cultural experience, the presence of socially esteemed models, and the like — are absent from the typical environment of Negro youth (2; 5).

Our study was designed, first, to test the general hypothesis that differences between Negro and whites would be found, with socio-economic status held constant, without any attempt to predict the direction of these differences. Second, we hoped that our interview material would provide us with a more rounded picture of the nature of the occupational choices as well as the backgrounds of the youth making these choices, so that we could then develop an explanatory hypothesis to be tested in further research.

The community in which we worked is a highly industrialized upstate New York City of some 50,000 people. It contains about 1,800 Negroes. Unlike most other Negro communities of the North, it has seen relatively little post-war in-migration of Negroes, though a very substantial number of the adults living there originally came from the South. The study was conducted in the spring of 1957.

The sample consisted of all the Negro students and a sample of the white students who had lived in and attended the two junior high schools in

the neighborhoods in which Negroes are concentrated — i.e., the poorest neighborhoods — and who entered the high school in that area in the years 1951-54. Our respondents were age 16 to 20, and ranged from juniors in high school to those who had graduated (or who would have graduated had they not dropped out) two years prior to the time of the study. The sample included all in this age range in the neighborhood except the few who had been left back in elementary school. It thus differs from the aforementioned studies, which sampled only those attending school. Usable interviews were completed with 61 of the 69 Negroes in the original sample, and with 64 of the 99 whites.*

The findings have been reported in great detail elsewhere (1). They will be summarized briefly here, and the major part of the paper will be devoted to the explanation we developed.

The central finding corroborates the results of previous studies: wherever trends and significant differences appear, the Negroes have a higher level of aspiration than the whites with a comparatively low socio-economic background. This is seen in the responses to six key questions:

1. "When you were in your first year of high school, what kind of work did you want to do when you grew up?" Excluding the "don't knows,"** the percentages choosing occupations in the professional, semi-professional, and executive categories were as fol-

*The large loss of whites — they had all moved away and could not be traced — may limit the validity of our findings. However, the failure to leave forwarding addresses and the subjective recall of the high school principal indicate that those who moved away were probably from drifting families. In any case, our generalizations can only refer to those whose homes were still in this city.

**This is the only one of the six questions with more than a very few "no responses." There were 27 Negro and 27 white boys, 34 Negro and 37 white girls in the sample.

lows: Negro boys, 72 per cent, white boys, 54 per cent; Negro girls, 45 per cent, white girls, 39 per cent. (Here, as in the following questions, the same contrast is found when only professions are considered.)

2. "Now what do you think you'd like to do?" Of the Negro boys, 64 per cent select the three occupational categories, compared to 41 per cent of the white boys. The comparable figures are 47 per cent for Negro girls, 27 per cent for white girls.
3. "Suppose your wildest dreams could be realized, and absolutely nothing would stand in your way, what would you be doing ten years from now?" The percentages choosing the top three groups are: Negro boys, 74 per cent, white boys, 64 per cent; Negro girls, 41 per cent, white girls, 22 per cent.
4. "Thinking realistically, what do you think you will probably be doing ten years from now?" Those expecting to be in the top three categories are: Negro boys, 45 per cent, white boys, 25 per cent; Negro girls, 24 per cent, white girls, 5 per cent.
5. "How much money do you think you (for girls: and your husband) will be making a week ten years from now, assuming the cost of living is the same as now?" Almost half (47 per cent) of the Negroes expect to have a weekly family income of \$125 or more, compared to 24 per cent of the whites.
6. "Please tell me which of the statements on No. 76 on your sheet comes closest to describing the way you feel about going to college or for further training." The proportions selecting "I intend to apply for entrance to college and hope to go if I am admitted"—which includes those who have already applied and/or have been admitted—are: Negro boys, 63 per cent, white boys, 26 per cent; Negro girls, 43 per cent, white girls, 11 per cent.

Though the two samples were intentionally taken from the poorest area in the city, a number of both Negro and white youth came from homes in which the parents were in lower middle class occupations. The groups were compared on the above items after these youth had been excluded. The differences between Negroes and whites, pointing in the same

direction as indicated, were then found to be even more striking.

The road to occupational achievement, the Negro youth seem to believe, is through education. When asked, in one way or another, about models, the Negroes, far more often than whites, refer to people who have succeeded where the accomplishment is based on education. In general, the Negro youth appear to have a more positive and constructive attitude toward school than the comparably lower status whites. They expect more of themselves and maintain more of a direction in their academic pursuits. There are no over-all differences between Negroes and whites on I.Q. scores, but both Negro boys and girls are more often enrolled in academic or commercial programs and less often in the shop, art, and home economics programs than are the white boys and girls. A higher proportion of Negroes were in the Regents (college preparatory) program and fewer had dropped out of school prior to graduation. Of those out of school, the numbers graduating were: 9 of 14 (64 per cent) Negro boys; 6 of 11 (54 per cent) white boys; 11 of 17 (65 per cent) Negro girls; and 6 of 25 (24 per cent) white girls. The Negroes recall having had more guidance meetings (though objectively this is not the case), report seeking out the advice of teachers more often, and more often see teachers as interested in the future of their students. Finally, fewer Negro youth report having done as well as they could have in school, though our data show that this is not the case.

The following is a summary of the background variables which might be thought relevant to these findings. The Negro youth come from outside the community more often than the whites, almost half the Negro parents being southern. The total Negro household income is no less than that of the whites, but this is because the

Negro mothers work more often. Negro fathers earn less and are in lower status occupations than even those white fathers living in the poorest areas. The Negroes have been less mobile occupationally. The Negro parents have also had, by and large, less education than the white parents. In other words, the Negro youth more often has a predominantly unsuccessful parent in terms of the criteria of success in our society.

Moreover, the Negro youth also tends to come from more disorganized family backgrounds. At the time of the study, 58 per cent of the Negroes came from homes which no longer contained both biological parents, compared to 31 per cent of the whites. Both parents were missing more frequently among the Negro group; this disorganization has resulted from divorce, separation or desertion (rather than death), and the home has been broken at an earlier age among Negro youth.

These background variables are, of course, in no way surprising. But from what we know about the relationship of low socio-economic status and aspirations in general, and what is frequently postulated about Negroes in our society — the key words being "apathy" and "alienation" — the findings on aspiration reported here are surprising. We do find what we would expect to find among the lower class white youth. But how can we explain the logically unexpected responses of Negro youth?

There are, we would propose, a number of factors which contribute to this pattern of responses. First, though Negro youth do not have personally-known models of high status with whom they can identify, many of them have been subjected to an important pressure: the traditional stress within the Negro community, particularly of late, on great men — George Washington Carver, Paul Lawrence

Dunbar, Ralph Bunche. It may well be that Negroes have — as whites have — virtually come to believe that there are two kinds of Negroes in America: the exceptional and the mass, with nothing between. To succeed can only mean to achieve highest status.

Second, over and above the general fact that it is most realistic in American society to seek mobility through education and professions — most people are aware of this — it is quite unrealistic for Negro youth in particular to seek success through the skilled trades, small business outside the Negro community, or corporate hierarchies. Negro youth are very well acquainted with the prevalent discrimination in these areas. If one is driven to succeed, then, particularly as a Negro, one is impelled to seek success through education and the professions.

Why, however, the intense desire to succeed and to be mobile? Given the values of our society as expressed through the mass media and the educational system, at the core of which lies the assumption that those who are not mobile are human failures, Negro youth, being exposed to these pressures no less than whites, would likewise be expected to be driven to get ahead. This alone, however, would not account for the higher aspirations of lower class Negro youth. Over and above this influence we would posit another pressure which would intensify this drive among Negroes: the acute problem of lack of self-esteem which besets the members of a minority group which has psychologically accepted its inferior status. An inordinate drive toward success can thus be seen as an expression of the search for enhanced self-esteem.

These factors, however, are rather general, and would be of limited explanatory value without being considered in conjunction with one further process widely characteristic, we

believe, of Negro youth. We suggest that a critical influence upon Negro youth, particularly in our present sphere of concern, is the existence of what we would call "models of dissociation." This is very distinct from the notion of the absence of role models. On the contrary, models do exist—models which, for a variety of reasons, not only are not identified with, but are used as clear examples of *what not to be like*. The process is an active, semi-conscious act of dissociation, in which adult Negroes are used as a negative reference group. (In general, it seems to us that the concept of negative reference groups may be even more useful—in areas ranging from the present one to an understanding of American foreign policy—than that of reference groups as it is commonly used.)

The white youth, even from a low-status background, is a member of the dominant racial group of our society. His father has, in most cases, at least a respectable occupation. There is often someone in his immediate family who has been moderately mobile and with whom he can identify, in whose occupational footsteps he can aspire to follow. A substantial proportion of the Negro youth studied here, on the other hand, either come from a home from which the father is absent, or have fathers who are notably less than successful, as are most other relative and family friends. At the same time, the Negro adolescent is keenly aware that his father—like all Negroes in our society—is by definition of an inferior status. He tends, then, to want urgently to escape the fate of his father by being as unlike him as possible, in contrast to the white, who can accept his father as a model, or someone else in his family, being content with seeking, perhaps, a one-step improvement.

We asked a number of questions relating to the participation of families

in planning the youth's future. We found no differences between Negroes and whites on the frequency of turning to parents for advice in planning the future. Nor is there any difference in the reports on the role of parents in influencing the young people's choice of careers. We did find one difference: while none of the parents of either group actually decide what occupations their children are to aim for, more Negro youngsters report that their parents actively help them plan their future. One final datum is relevant here. Negro parents more often than white parents have rewarded their children for successful school activities.

At first glance, it may be thought that the findings that the Negro parents play at least as active a role in planning the child's future as do white parents contradicts the hypothesis of the process of dissociation as the crucial factor in explaining the differences in occupational choice. This is not necessarily the case. The parents, we suggest, ardently concur in the process of dissociation. They too—and possibly this is where the children get the idea in the first place—wish their children to be as unlike themselves as possible. We would venture a guess that the phrase "I don't want you to lead the life I led" or some variant of it is frequently heard in these homes. This pattern is frequently found among immigrant groups, and it is not at all surprising to find it among Negroes.

The final problem we would touch on here is the nature of the Negro youth's relatively high level of occupational aspiration. It is high, it must be stressed, relative to the level of similarly lower class but white youth. We do not know how it would compare to the level of aspirations of middle class Negro youth, or how these would compare to middle class whites in this area. Whatever a study with

such data would show on the measures of level of occupational aspiration used here, we would guess that there would be a qualitative difference between the high aspirations found among lower class Negro youth on the one hand and middle class youth, both white and Negro, on the other. For both the latter, high aspirations would be a "following in the footsteps of"; for lower class Negro youth, high aspirations are a "getting away from."

Aspirations are but one of the first steps in the process of entering an occupation, reflecting a given value orientation. They are not to be dismissed, for they influence later steps in this process, insofar as these are within the control of the aspirant. The tone of the interviews and the consistent pattern of responses indicate that the Negro youth with high aspirations, at least at this stage, take them seriously. Nonetheless, it was felt to be important in collecting and analyzing the data to consider to some extent the question of how realistic these aspirations are, that is, how good the chances are that the stated hopes will be realized.

Thirty of the Negro youngsters indicated that they intended to apply for admission to college or had already done so, in addition to the 7 who are already in college. But an optimistic analysis of the I.Q. scores and high school records (data were unavailable for two respondents) shows that only 8 could probably be admitted to college, another 8 might be, while it is highly unlikely that 12 had the prerequisites for college admission.

Similarly tenuous are the chances for achieving professional and semi-professional careers by the 33 Negro youth who aspire to them. Almost without exception such positions require post-high school training. Analysis of I.Q. data and of high school records, again being optimistic, indicates that at best 7 of the 33 had a

fair chance of entering the high level occupation of their choice; 12 were in the questionable category; while 14 stood little or no chance of attaining such goals.

Thus there is little doubt that the high stated aspirations of these Negro youngsters have large components of unrealism. If the aspirations are held seriously, then our proffered explanation would lead us to expect serious psychological and social-psychological consequences of the failure to realize the aspirations. It would be most valuable to follow our subjects for a number of years and inquire into their fates and reactions to their fates. Unfortunately, we are in no position to do this. We might, however, speculate briefly about the futures of those who will not realize their aspirations.

Certainly some may compromise and, with good fortune, end up in lower white collar occupations or skilled manual work (e.g., through training while in military service). The core of their value orientation as explained here—to be in a significantly different situation from their parents—would then be realized. The negative reference group—lower class Negroes—would continue to be operative. There would not necessarily be a sense of failure; objectively, as a matter of fact, mobility would be considerable.

For others, however, failure to get into college may well lead to an intense sense of bitterness and alienation. This, in turn, might result in a rejection of the value orientation, of the middle class virtues of achievement and respectability, and a plunge into apathy or anti-social behavior.

(We would parenthetically add a word not only to avoid misinterpretation, but to point to a dangerous assumption which is frequently made by many, particularly guidance counselors. It is important that the findings reported here not be misread as suggesting the desirability of pressuring

Negro youth toward lower levels of aspiration under the guise of greater "realism." Efforts should rather be directed toward the early identification and fostering of individual talents.)

It must be remembered that the data reported here—though they corroborate the findings of other studies in this area—refer to a single, small community which has not had any significant Negro in-migration. Moreover, it may well be that the one-third of the original white sample who left the community and could not be contacted is precisely the most ambitious white part of the group. These caveats and the hypothesis advanced here will be tested in a study presently being conducted among tenth graders in New York City high schools. Preliminary analysis of these data tend to confirm the findings reported here.

Certainly the aspirational orientations and the attitudes toward school found in this community differ from the many impressionistic (and largely sensational newspaper) accounts of Negro youth in large metropolitan centers. A study presently being conducted by the senior author in New York City high schools will provide data which will allow us to test the findings presented here.

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NEGRO-JEWISH PREJUDICE: AUTHORITARIANISM AND SOME SOCIAL VARIABLES AS CORRELATES*

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Since the publication of the classic study by Adorno et al. (1), numerous

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researchers have confirmed their finding that authoritarianism is associated with ethnic prejudice (2). Most studies, however, have focused on the attitudes of majority group (white non-Jewish) subjects. This paper will report tests of five hypotheses designed to discover whether authoritarianism is associated with anti-Semitism among

Negroes and with anti-Negro prejudice among Jews. Findings will also be presented showing the relationships between prejudice and certain social variables among Negroes and Jews.

METHOD

Staff members of the Cornell University Intergroup Relations Project interviewed, in the summer of 1949, 150 Negroes and 150 Jews randomly selected from the Negro and Jewish populations aged 21 and older in a north-eastern city of about 60 thousand population. Included in the interview schedule were the following questions, which were used to measure prejudice:

Tension Questions

(a) "On the whole, would you say you like or dislike (Negroes, Jews)?" If dislike: "Are your feelings about (Negroes, Jews) very strong, pretty strong, or not strong at all?"

(b) "As you see it, are (Negroes, Jews) today demanding more than they have a right to or not?" If yes: "Does this make you pretty angry, a little angry, or don't you feel strongly?"

(c) "Do you think that (Negroes, Jews) today are trying to push in where they are not wanted?" If yes: "Does this bother you a great deal, a little, or hardly at all?"

Social Distance Questions

"Do you think you would ever find it a little distasteful:

(a) to eat at the same table with a (Negro, Jew)?"

(b) to dance with a (Negro, Jew)?"

(c) to go to a party and find that most of the people are Negroes, Jews)?"

(d) to have a (Negro, Jew) marry someone in your family?"

Stereotype Question

Asked of Jews: Agree or disagree:

"Generally speaking, Negroes are lazy and ignorant."

Asked of Negroes: Agree or disagree: "Although some Jews are honest, in general Jews are dishonest in their business dealings."

To construct a measure of prejudice, respondents were assigned separate scores on the tension, social distance, and stereotype questions and these three scores were combined into an over-all prejudice score. In assigning tension scores, on each tension question the most unprejudiced response counted zero, the most prejudiced (an unfavorable response about which the subject felt very strongly) counted two, and any other response counted one. In assigning social distance scores, each affirmative response counted one and each negative response zero. On the stereotype questions, respondents were simply classified according to whether they agreed, disagreed, or gave "don't know" answers to the questions. It was found (3, pp. 5-11) that the tension scores, social distance scores, and stereotype answers were sufficiently intercorrelated to make feasible a combination of the three into an over-all prejudice score, in the following way. Respondents were divided into high-prejudice and low-prejudice groups as nearly equal in size as possible on the basis of their tension scores; the high-prejudice respondents were given two points, the low-prejudice respondents, zero. The same procedure was followed with the social distance scores, each respondent receiving two or zero points. On the stereotype questions, agreement with the stereotype gave a score of two, "don't know" one, and disagreement zero. Adding these scores, all respondents were assigned over-all prejudice scores ranging from zero to six. Seventy-five Negroes had scores from zero to three and were designated "low-prejudice Negroes." The remaining 75 Negroes, with scores from four

TABLE 1
AUTHORITARIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND PREJUDICE

| Distribution of Negroes and Jews by Authoritarian and Non-Authoritarian Characteristics | | | Prejudice | | X^2* | df | p |
|---|------------------|--|-----------|----------|--------|----|------|
| | | | High % | Low % | | | |
| Punitiveness | | | | | | | |
| Negroes: | High (N:36) | | 67 | 33 | 7.89 | 1 | <.01 |
| | Low (N:99) | | 39 | 61 | | | |
| Jews: | High (N:51) | | 63 | 37 | 7.85 | 1 | <.01 |
| | Low (N:89) | | 38 | 62 | | | |
| Jungle Philosophy | | | | | | | |
| Negroes: | High (N:68) | | 57 | 43 | 2.70 | 1 | <.06 |
| | Low (N:82) | | 44 | 56 | | | |
| Jews: | High (N:48) | | 56 | 44 | 1.63 | 1 | <.11 |
| | Low (N:102) | | 45 | 55 | | | |
| Intrapunitiveness | | | | | | | |
| Negroes: | Low (N:57) | | 61 | 39 | 4.95 | 1 | <.02 |
| | High (N:85) | | 42 | 58 | | | |
| Jews: | Low (N:53) | | 64 | 36 | 8.76 | 1 | <.01 |
| | High (N:93) | | 39 | 61 | | | |
| Conventional Religiousness | | | | | | | |
| Religious Attendance | | | | | | | |
| Negroes: | High (N:57) | | 65 | 35 | 8.75 | 1 | <.01 |
| | Low (N:88) | | 40 | 60 | | | |
| Jews: | High (N:91) | | 49 | 51 | .06 | 1 | <.45 |
| | Low (N:57) | | 47 | 53 | | | |
| Religious Membership | | | | | | | |
| Jews: | Synagogue (N:81) | | 56 | 44 | 5.03 | 2 | <.08 |
| | Temple (N:53) | | 43 | 57 | | | |
| | Neither (N:15) | | 27 | 73 | | | |
| Observance of Customs | | | | | | | |
| Jews, Synagogue: | High (N:43) | | 65 | 35 | 5.57 | 1 | <.01 |
| | Low (N:36) | | 42 | 58 | | | |
| Jews, Temple: | High (N:21) | | 57 | 43 | 3.18 | 1 | <.04 |
| | Low (N:31) | | 32 | 68 | | | |
| Jews, Combined Congregations | High (N:64) | | 62 | 38 | 8.30 | 1 | <.01 |
| | Low (N:67) | | 37 | 63 | | | |
| Status Striving | | | | | | | |
| Negroes: | High (N:72) | | 40 | 60 | 6.92 | 2 | <.04 |
| | Medium (N:56) | | 55 | 45 | | | |
| | Low (N:18) | | 72 | 28 | | | |
| Jews: | High (N:42) | | 43 | 57 | — | — | — |
| | Medium (N:63) | | 52 | 48 | | | |
| | Low (N:20) | | 40 | 60 | | | |

*One-tail test used where df = 1.

to six, were designated "high-prejudice Negroes." Seventy-seven Jews with scores zero to two were designated "low-prejudice Jews" and 73 with scores three to six were designated "high-prejudice Jews." All further analysis of the data was based on this classification of respondents as high- and low-prejudice Negroes and Jews.

Various questionnaire items were used as indicators of different aspects of authoritarianism. These items will be presented in connection with the specific hypotheses to which they relate.

FINDINGS:

AUTHORITARIANISM AND PREJUDICE

Tests of five hypotheses derived from the general theory that authoritarianism is associated with prejudice among Negroes and Jews will be presented. Table 1 summarizes all these findings.

Hypothesis 1. People with a punitive, disciplinarian outlook tend to be highly prejudiced. Two questions were used to measure punitiveness:

(a) Agree or disagree: "The most important thing to teach children is to obey every order their parents give without question even if they think the parents are wrong."

(b) Agree or disagree: "Prison is too good for sex criminals. They should be publicly whipped or worse."

According to our hypothesis, agreement with these statements should be associated with prejudice, and this was found to be the case. Of the Negroes who agreed with both statements—designated high in punitiveness in Table 1—67 per cent were in the high-prejudice group, as compared with 39 per cent of those who agreed with only one statement or neither. A Chi-square test of this finding shows a probability less than .01. Among the Jews, 63 per cent of those who agreed with one or both statements but only 38 per cent of those who disagreed

with both were high in prejudice. A Chi-square test shows a probability less than .01.

These data on both Negroes and Jews support Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2. People who view life as a harsh, competitive struggle tend to be highly prejudiced. On the basis of three questions, each respondent was assigned a score which measured the extent to which he subscribed to a viewpoint labeled the "jungle philosophy." One who adheres to this philosophy, according to our hypothesis, carries a rich vein of hostility which finds an outlet in ethnic prejudice. The three questions, and the way in which they were scored in assigning "jungle philosophy scores," are as follows:

(a) "Some say you can't be too careful in your dealings with others, while others say that most people can be trusted. From your experience, which would you agree with more?" ("Can't be too careful" gets one point for jungle philosophy score.)

(b) Agree or disagree: "I have to struggle for everything I get in life." ("Agree" gets one point.)

(c) "How often do you find yourself bitter about the way things have turned out for you? Would you say often, sometimes, or hardly ever?" ("Often" or "sometimes" gets one point.)

Negroes averaged considerably higher in jungle philosophy than Jews. The 68 Negroes who scored three were classified high in jungle philosophy, as were the 48 Jews who scored either two or three.

The hypothesized relationship between jungle philosophy and prejudice was found to exist among both Negroes and Jews, but neither finding was significant at the .05 level on a Chi-square test. Therefore Hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted as confirmed, although the relationships found were in the hypothesized direction.

Hypothesis 3. Intrapunitive people tend to be relatively unprejudiced. Intrapunitive people were defined as those who agreed with the statement, "When things go wrong, I usually find that it's my own fault." The hypothesized relationship between intrapunitive-ness and low prejudice was found in both ethnic groups, and the probabilities of obtaining Chi-squares as large as those obtained were less than .02 for the Negroes and less than .01 for the Jews. These findings support Hypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 4. Conventionally religious people tend to be highly prejudiced. This hypothesis is derived from the finding by Adorno et al. (1) that the authoritarian is highly conventional in his social attitudes and behavior, using conventional beliefs as an emotional anchor to cling to in an uncertain and dangerous world.

Negroes' frequency of church attendance was used to measure their conventional religiousness. Table 1 shows that Negroes high in religious attendance—those who reported attending services most Sundays or every Sunday—were, as predicted, more likely to be highly prejudiced than were the infrequent attenders or non-attenders. A Chi-square test shows a probability less than .01.

Among the Jews, however, respondents high in religious attendance—those who reported attending both High Holy Day and Sabbath services—were not significantly more prejudiced than those who reported attending services on High Holy Days only or not at all.

In a further effort to see whether conventional religiousness might be associated with anti-Negro prejudice among Jews, the Jews were classified according to whether they belonged to the Orthodox Synagogue, the Reform Temple, or neither. As predicted, Synagogue members tended to be more prejudiced than Temple mem-

bers, and Jews who did not belong to either congregation were the least prejudiced of all, though this finding was not significant at the .05 level on a Chi-square test.

In a further test of the relation between religiousness and prejudice among Jews, Temple and Synagogue members were classified according to whether they believed that Jews should observe most, only some, or hardly any Jewish customs such as dietary laws. Synagogue members who believed in following most Jewish customs, and Temple members who believed in following most or some customs, were designated high in conventional religiousness. The hypothesized relationship between religiousness and prejudice was found, with Chi-square tests showing probabilities less than .01 and .04 for Synagogue and Temple members respectively. When the high-religious and low-religious categories of Synagogue and Temple members were combined to produce a single high-or-low-religious dichotomy for all Jews who belonged to either congregation, 62 per cent of the highly religious Jews but only 37 per cent of the less religious Jews were in the high-prejudice group. For this tabulation, a Chi-square test shows a probability less than .01.

Thus the data on both Negroes and Jews are consistent with Hypothesis 4.

Hypothesis 5. Status-strivers tend to be highly prejudiced. Studies of authoritarianism have found that status, like power, is very important to the authoritarian individual. From this we would expect status-striving to be associated with prejudice, and a number of studies have confirmed this expectation (2).

In the present study, two questions were used to measure the extent of status-striving:

(a) "Do you think a person's aim in life should be to constantly try to

get ahead in his work, or do you think if he has a job he likes he should settle down and be contented?"

(b) "Do you think a person should keep trying to get into a better class of people socially, or should he stick pretty much to the social friends he grew up with?"

In Table 1, respondents are classified according to whether they gave status-striving responses to both questions (high status-strivers), to one but not both (medium), or to neither (low). The results among the Negroes were the *opposite* of our prediction. Negroes high in status-striving were the least prejudiced, and Negroes low in status-striving were the most

prejudiced. The differences were large (28 per cent vs. 60 per cent highly prejudiced) and significant at the .04 level on a Chi-square test. Among the Jews, there was no consistent relationship in either direction between status-striving and prejudice.

Hypothesis 5 therefore cannot be accepted. The substantially different results obtained among Negroes and among Jews suggest that additional research would be needed to clarify the relationships between status-striving and differing degrees of prejudice.

FINDINGS:

SOCIAL CORRELATES OF PREJUDICE

Statistical findings showing the asso-

TABLE 2
SOCIAL VARIABLES AND PREJUDICE

| Distribution of Negroes and Jews by Social Variables | | Prejudice | | X ² | df | p |
|---|--|-----------|----------|----------------|----|------|
| | | High % | Low % | | | |
| Social Isolation | | | | | | |
| Negroes: | No Friends (N:76) | 59 | 41 | 5.23* | 1 | <.02 |
| | Friends (N:74) | 41 | 59 | | | |
| Jews: | No Friends (N:62) | 60 | 40 | 5.09* | 1 | <.02 |
| | Friends (N:88) | 41 | 59 | | | |
| Negroes: | No Organizations (N:65) | 62 | 38 | 6.11* | 1 | <.01 |
| | One or more Organizations (N:85) | 41 | 59 | | | |
| Jews: | 3 or fewer Organizations (N:74) | 58 | 42 | 4.57* | 1 | <.02 |
| | 4 or more Organizations (N:74) | 41 | 59 | | | |
| Sex, Education, Age | | | | | | |
| Negroes: | Men (N:68) | 25 | 75 | 30.89 | 1 | <.01 |
| | Women (N:79) | 71 | 29 | | | |
| Jews: | Noncollege, age 34 and under (N:11) | 36 | 64 | ** | | |
| | Noncollege, age 35-54 (N:31) | 74 | 26 | | | |
| | Noncollege, age 55 and over (N:24) | 79 | 21 | | | |
| | College, age 34 and under (N:25) | 28 | 72 | | | |
| | College, age 35-54 (N:28) | 29 | 71 | | | |
| | College, age 55 and over (N:7) | 14 | 86 | | | |

*One-tail test.

**Chi-square not computed because of small expected frequencies in some cells.

ciation of social characteristics with prejudice are given in Table 2. These findings include the test of one hypothesis regarding social isolation and prejudice, and findings regarding sex, education, and age as correlates of prejudice.

Hypothesis 6. Social isolates tend to be highly prejudiced. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that people who feel socially inadequate will tend to avoid extensive social contacts, and will use ethnic prejudice as an unconscious ego-bolstering device. Alternatively, one might reason that people who are denied social contact with others will come to feel inadequate and will therefore use ethnic prejudice as an ego-support. Two questions were used to measure social isolation:

(a) "Do you have a bunch of close friends who visit back and forth in each other's homes?"

(b) "Do you belong to any organizations, not counting church?"

The prediction, that people who had no close friends and who belonged to no organizations would be the most prejudiced, was borne out at the .02 level of significance or better for both questions among both Negroes and Jews.

Sex, education, age, and prejudice. We began with no hypotheses regarding sex, education, and age as correlates of prejudice, although we expected to find the greatest amount of prejudice among the older and less educated respondents. The findings were not what we expected, and we have no satisfactory explanation for them. They are presented simply as data, in the hope that future research will clarify the relationships found.

Among Negroes, no consistent or significant relationship was found between either age or education and anti-Semitism. (These results are not shown in Table 2.) Negro women,

however, were strikingly more prejudiced than Negro men. More than two-thirds of the Negro women, but only a fourth of the Negro men, were in the high-prejudice half of the Negro sample. No other variable, with the exception of the educational level among Jews, showed so high an association with prejudice. Further tabulation controlling on other variables (not shown) failed to explain the differences between Negro men and Negro women.

Among the Jews, education was very strongly related to prejudice. College-educated Jews were less than half as likely as those without college education to be highly prejudiced. Since it is well known that the younger people in all ethnic groups are remaining in school longer than their elders did, we felt that the negative association between education and prejudice among the Jews might be explainable on the basis of their age. To examine this possibility, the high and low prejudice groups of Jews were classified by both age and education. When this was done, it was found that age differences in prejudice were not the explanation for the educational differences, but instead differences between educational levels provided the explanation for what would otherwise have appeared to be differences in prejudice between age groups. (The younger but less educated Jews, who tended to be low in prejudice, were an exception to this generalization.)

Jewish men and Jewish women did not differ significantly in prejudice. (This finding is not shown in the Table.) Thus we find, paradoxically, that age and education were related to prejudice among Jews but not among Negroes, while sex was related to prejudice among Negroes but not among Jews.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The data lend support to four of the five hypotheses relating prejudice to

aspects of authoritarianism, and to the hypothesis that social isolation is associated with prejudice. The discussion below will be confined to the one authoritarianism hypothesis which did not work out as expected and the findings regarding sex, education, and age as correlates of prejudice.

Status-striving. The hypothesis that status-strivers are highly prejudiced was derived from the authoritarian personality hypothesis; status-striving is generally held to be a characteristic of the authoritarian personality. This hypothesis, as we have seen, was not borne out. Status-striving showed no significant relationship to prejudice among Jews, and was *negatively* related to anti-Semitism among Negroes.

We are frankly unable to suggest any explanation for the negative finding about status-striving and prejudice among Jews. It would make sense to hypothesize that *moderate* status-striving is correlated with lack of prejudice and extreme striving or extreme nonstriving is correlated with high prejudice, on the ground that the emotionally secure individual in our culture will be a moderate striver and will be relatively unprejudiced. Our finding, however, while not statistically significant, suggests that the moderate strivers among Jews may be the *most* prejudiced. For this we have no explanation.

Among the Negroes, a plausible explanation for the negative association between status-striving and prejudice can be ventured, subject to future test. It may be that anti-Semitism among Negroes is a function of emotional insecurity, not merely of the authoritarian defense against insecurity. It may also be that among Negroes, the non-strivers are the least emotionally secure; they are people who do not strive because they have lost hope. This suggestion is consistent with the lack of relationship between striving and prejudice among the Jews. Jews, un-

like Negroes, have comparatively little difficulty in improving their social position if they are determined to do so.

Prejudice among men and women. We know of no reason to expect Jewish men and women to differ in anti-Negro prejudice; therefore our finding that they did not differ in our sample does not seem to require explanation. We are left, however, with the finding that Negro women were much more anti-Semitic than were Negro men.

Williams (4, p. 69) hypothesizes that contacts between members of two groups will reduce prejudice if the persons interact "as functional equals, on a common task jointly accepted as worthwhile." Contact between members of different groups, where one is subordinate to the other, is more likely to intensify any stereotypes and hostilities which exist. It seems likely that Negro women interact with whites as equals less often than Negro men do. Negro women work as domestic servants under the command of white women, or in menial capacities as kitchen workers, cleaning women, and the like in business organizations. If they do not work for white employers, they stay at home and have virtually no contact with whites except in secondary relationships such as shopping. Negro men, on the other hand, are much more likely to work with white men as equals; or if they occupy subordinate positions, they often engage in the banter and give-and-take which are more characteristic of male than of female informal group life; consider, for example, the joking and horseplay of workers at service stations, white and Negro, North and South. These facts, coupled with Williams' hypothesis, may help to explain the greater anti-Semitism found among the women in our Negro sample. It is also likely that some Negro women in our sample worked as domestics for Jewish housewives, thus adding a specifically Jewish com-

ponent to whatever anti-white feelings they may have had.

Education, age, and prejudice. Among Negroes, neither education nor age was significantly related to prejudice. Among Jews, however, the youthful and the college-educated showed the least prejudice. A plausible explanation for this finding lies in the realm of inter-ethnic contacts. Jews of the younger generation, and virtually all college-educated Jews, have had extensive contacts with Gentiles. Older, less educated Jews are more likely to have confined their social participation to limited circles of Jewish friends and relatives, where Jewish ethnocentrism and stereotyped ideas about the Goyim — including Negroes — prevail.

These interpretations are of course sheer speculation, but the findings regarding social correlates of prejudice are so striking that they seem to call for further research. All findings, including the tests of hypotheses, should

be interpreted with caution. They are based on a single survey in one city; and the validity of interview items as indicators of deep-seated psychodynamic patterns may be open to question and has not been established in the present instance. Moreover, the number of cases was too small to permit a number of cross-tabulations which might have helped to clarify some of the relationships found.

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URBANIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE SOUTH

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The relatively rapid rate of urbanization in the South poses the problem of the bearing of urbanization on the breakdown of a caste-like system. The purpose of the present paper is to investigate one facet of this larger question, the relationship between urbanization and certain specific indices of economic and educational discrimination derived from Census data for a sample of Southern counties.* It is a well-known fact that non-whites are migrating to Northern and Southern cities in order to improve their eco-

nomic status. It is also commonly assumed that certain requirements of an urban society are incompatible with a caste system. These factors would lead us to predict that as the South urbanizes we will find a decreasing degree of discrimination. It was the principal hypothesis of this study, however, that although the absolute levels of living for both whites and non-whites might be higher in the urban areas, there would be no negative correlations between indices of urbanization and discrimination if the latter indices were measured in terms of differentials be-

*Other portions of the larger study have been reported elsewhere. See (2) and (3).

tween white and non-white levels.*

In order to justify this prediction that the absolute gap between the levels of the two groups will not decrease with urbanization, it must be remembered that the South is still in the early stages of industrialization. There can be no doubting the fact that the nature of industrialization, or lack of it, in the South is closely related to the previous existence of a plantation economy and to the presence of a large number of non-whites having a standard of living considerably below that of most whites. Urbanization in the South has at least in part taken a form which is comparable to that developed in certain colonial territories. In the competitive process it has relied on a relatively cheap and docile labor force and on the absence of a strong and organized labor movement. It is therefore entirely possible that as the South continues to urbanize, at least in the early stages in which it must rely on its competitive advantage of lower wages, non-whites may remain in the most unskilled positions. The income levels of both groups may indeed rise, but for quite some time a constant or even an increasing gap may be maintained between the absolute levels of the two groups.

Several factors might operate to reduce such a gap. If there developed strong industrial-type unions in which the prevailing philosophy involved co-operation between white and non-white workers to improve the level of living of both groups, we would in-

deed expect the gap to diminish.** But such a unified labor movement has not yet occurred. The competitive advantage of non-whites who are willing to work for lower wages is another factor which might operate to reduce the differential between the two groups. It might also be argued that the very needs of an urban society require, for the sake of efficiency, the allocation of manpower according to skills and ability rather than race. The case of South Africa makes it clear that these factors need not be of overwhelming significance, however. It is entirely possible, for example, that white workers will unite in industrial unions, demanding and getting differential pay scales and requiring that all positions above a certain level be reserved for members of their own group. Under conditions of labor surplus, this might even be accomplished with little loss of efficiency. Or rather, the slight loss of efficiency might be outweighed in the minds of employers by the advantages of having a large pool of very cheap labor readily available, or by the fear of violence, restrictive legislation, or poor local public relations. The writer is not claiming that the absolute gap between the groups will in fact be increased by urbanization. He is suggesting that we cannot assume that a reduction of discrimination *necessarily* will follow urbanization. To assume this would be to assume a theory of economic determinism which

*Shortly after this hypothesis was formulated, a study by Becker (1, Ch. 9) was published in which there appeared certain findings consistent with this prediction. Becker found that occupational gains for Negroes, as compared to those of whites, remained relatively fixed between 1910 and 1950 in both the North and the South. The present study, in contrast to Becker's longitudinal analysis, is cross-sectional in that counties at varying levels of urbanization are compared at a single point in time.

**In this connection, negative correlations between indices of income and occupational discrimination and per cent in manufacturing were found to be much stronger in Midwestern S. M. A.'s than in other non-Southern cities. Cities such as Detroit and Youngstown, having strong industrial-type unions, had discrimination rates which were considerably lower than those of comparable cities. On the other hand, Turner (6) found a significant *positive* correlation between per cent in manufacturing and unemployment differentials, possibly indicating that there is relatively less job security for non-whites in industrial centers.

is just as unrealistic as the contrasting theory that the folkways and mores of the South can never be modified by industrialization.

If the levels of living of both whites and non-whites are raised in such a manner that the absolute gap between the two groups remains constant or even increases slightly, it still may be argued that discrimination is being reduced. This depends, of course, on the way discrimination is defined or measured. If *relative* rates are used to compare the two groups, then the group having the lower initial rate will practically always show the greatest gains. Relative rates, however, can be extremely misleading under certain circumstances. For example, an increase in the proportion of professionals of from one to three per cent among non-whites represents a 200 per cent increase, whereas a change of from ten to twenty per cent among whites gives "only" a 100 per cent increase. If the initial levels of both groups are quite low in terms of some absolute criterion, absolute gains may be much more meaningful both statistically and in terms of psychological meaning to the individual. It is certainly not being argued that relative measures of change are never appropriate or that absolute differences do not also have certain pitfalls. But it should be noted that it is very easy to exaggerate the gains being made by non-whites if only these relative figures are given.

METHODS

The sample consisted of 150 counties selected at random from all Southern counties having at least 250 non-white households. Virginia was not included since county data were not comparable with data for other states. States included consisted of the remaining ten states in Odum's Southeast (5, p. 7 ff). The following indices of discrimination were computed from 1950 Census data: (a) *Home-*

ownership: percentage of occupants who were homeowners; (b) *Overcrowding*: percentage of dwelling units with one or fewer persons per room; (c) *Income*: percentage of families having annual incomes of \$1,500 or more; and (d) *Education*: percentage of males 25 and over having completed more than 6 years of schooling.* Figures were obtained for both whites and non-whites, and since for each variable a high percentage indicates a high level of living, an index of discrimination involving differentials was obtained by subtracting the non-white percentage from that of the whites.

A number of indices of urbanization were investigated in an exploratory analysis. Since all of the indices ultimately used had very similar correlations with the dependent variables, only one of these indices, the percentage of the population classified as urban, will be reported in detail in this paper. Brief comments will be made concerning the remaining indices of urbanization. For this portion of the larger study the following control variables were used: the percentage of non-whites, the rate of non-white increase, and an urbanization ratio measuring the degree to which non-whites were under-represented in urban areas. Since it was found that only the percentage of non-whites produced partials significantly different from zero-order correlations, the partials with respect to non-white increase and the urbanization ratio will not be reported.

FINDINGS

In Table 1 are given the correlations of per cent urban with white and non-white levels of living for each of the four indices used. Notice that correlations with homeownership are ex-

*The remaining two indices used in the larger study involved only urban residents and therefore could not be used in this part of the analysis.

TABLE 1

CORRELATIONS OF PER CENT URBAN WITH WHITE AND NON-WHITE LEVELS OF LIVING AND WITH DISCRIMINATION INDICES

| Type of Index | White Levels | | Non-White Levels | | Discrimination Indices | |
|------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| | Total Correlation | Partial Correlation† | Total Correlation | Partial Correlation† | Total Correlation | Partial Correlation† |
| Homeownership .. | -.148 | -.198* | .023 | -.155 | -.137 | .011 |
| Overcrowding ... | .229* | .278* | .385* | .306* | -.228* | -.080 |
| Income | .647* | .687* | .600* | .564* | .139 | .329* |
| Education | .422* | .506* | .291* | .194* | .026 | .300* |

†Control for per cent non-white.

*Only these correlations are significant beyond .05 level.

tremely low for both whites and non-whites, with and without a control for per cent non-white. All remaining correlations with white and non-white scores are positive and significant at the .05 level, although some are quite small in magnitude. Controlling for per cent non-white generally increases correlations for whites but reduces those for non-whites. Both with and without the control, income and educational indices correlate more highly with per cent urban in the case of whites than in that of non-whites. This seems to indicate slightly greater absolute gains from urbanization for whites, a fact which is consistent with the low-moderate *positive* partial correlations between per cent urban and income and educational differentials.* With the control, correlations with

differentials on both housing variables were negligible. Thus we see that, if anything, correlations between discrimination indices and per cent urban tend to be positive, indicating a slightly larger gap in urbanized counties.

The exact nature of the gap for the income index is indicated in Table 2. In order to obtain a larger number of highly urbanized counties a supplementary sample of 45 counties was taken consisting of all counties listed as being 70 per cent or more urban plus a random sample of counties having between 60.0 and 69.9 per cent

*These gains can be measured by the slopes of least squares equations which are not shown in Table 1 but which were roughly proportional to the *r*'s. Unfortunately, in interpreting these results we cannot separate out the possible disturbing effects of selective migration.

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGES OF WHITES AND NON-WHITES WITH INCOMES OF \$1,500 OR MORE FOR DIFFERENT DEGREES OF URBANIZATION

| Per Cent Urban (1) | No. of Counties (2) | Whites (3) | Non-Whites (4) | Difference (5) | Adjusted Difference* (6) |
|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| 0.0 - 9.9% | 53 | 49.2% | 17.3% | 31.9% | 28.7% |
| 10.0 - 29.9 | 44 | 53.4 | 23.0 | 30.4 | 31.0 |
| 30.0 - 49.9 | 32 | 63.4 | 30.0 | 33.4 | 34.4 |
| 50.0 - 69.9 | 25 | 67.5 | 33.3 | 34.2 | 36.8 |
| 70.0 - 79.9 | 26 | 71.8 | 35.9 | 35.9 | 36.4 |
| 80.0 - 99.9 | 15 | 73.0 | 43.6 | 29.4 | 31.6 |
| 195 | | | | | |

*Adjusted for per cent non-white using analysis of co-variance. Adjusted differences are significant at the .001 level.

urban populations. Counties were then grouped into intervals according to urban percentages. Figures in the body of the table indicate mean percentages of families having incomes of \$1,500 or more. As we would expect, these percentages increase for both whites and non-whites as we go from the least to the most urban counties. Obviously, we cannot equate these figures with real income differences between urban and rural counties since the cost of living may have been higher in urban areas and since rural-farm and urban cash incomes are by no means comparable. Nevertheless, the data do indicate substantially higher proportions of families having larger cash incomes in urban areas.

When we examine column 5 we find that differentials remain relatively fixed as we go down the table.* In order to control for per cent non-white, an adjusted difference column was computed. As can be seen, adjusting has the effect of decreasing the difference score for counties having populations less than 10 per cent urban and increasing the remaining difference scores so as to present a clearer picture of the trend involved. Notice that these adjusted difference scores increase until we reach the highly urbanized counties, at which point there is a slight reversal of direction. Although differences among these adjusted differentials are significant at the .001 level, they are still not particularly large in magnitude. Unfortunately, the number of counties

*In order to investigate the possibility that this pattern of differentials was due to the fact that the measure used involved the percentage of families having incomes of \$1,500 or more rather than some other measure such as median income, the writer obtained estimates of the difference patterns that would occur under various assumptions about the white and non-white income distributions. The results were essentially similar to those given in Table 2 except that for several models, difference scores were somewhat lower for counties over 80 per cent urban.

over 80 per cent urban is quite small. There is a slight suggestion of non-linearity, however, indicating a possible decreasing of the gap between whites and non-whites in the most highly urbanized counties. We might infer from this that in its advanced stages urbanization will lead to a decreasing differential between the groups, but further research will be needed to establish this tentative hypothesis as fact.

It was thought that possibly certain other indices of urbanization might yield higher correlations with discrimination indices. Using as an index of urbanization the percentage of urban and rural non-farm residents gave almost identical results as using per cent urban alone. Of the other indices finally selected after exploratory analyses with rank order correlations, the percentage of females in the labor force produced the highest correlations. With a control for per cent non-white, the correlations between the percentage of females in the labor force and income and educational differentials were .404 and .326 respectively. The somewhat higher correlation with the income index than in the case of per cent urban may be in part due to the familiar pattern of hiring non-white domestics, permitting the white women to supplement the family income and thereby adding a further increment to the differential between the two groups. Correlations between discrimination indices and per cent in manufacturing were non-significant, with and without controls. This finding is in marked contrast with that for non-Southern S.M.A.'s but is essentially as predicted. Two agricultural indices thought to be indirectly associated with urbanization, the total valuation of farm land and buildings and the percentage of total acreage planted in cotton, were also found to be unrelated to any of the discrimination indices once controls

were introduced for per cent non-white.

CONCLUSIONS

The study tended to support the hypothesis that there are no negative correlations between various indices of urbanization and several types of discrimination, if the latter are measured in terms of differentials between white and non-white levels of living. In fact, somewhat higher income and educational differentials were noted for the more urbanized counties. The data indicated a slight tendency for counties which were over 80 per cent urban to have relatively smaller income differentials, but there were too few cases to establish a definite trend. Thus the data seem to indicate that although the *relative* gain from urbanization for non-whites may be substantial owing to a low starting point, the absolute differences between the two groups have been thus far maintained. It has been argued that it is therefore by no means inevitable that urbanization will lead to a lessening of all types of discrimination. It is entirely possible that whites will continue to maintain their superior economic position by creating a tight "job ceiling" above which few non-whites will be admitted.

We should not conclude, however, that urbanization can be expected to leave a caste-like system completely intact. The ideal-type caste system is most easily associated with a peasant or feudal type of society characterized by a static culture, traditional authority, ascribed roles, small communities, highly personal relationships, and a sacred outlook on life. Theoretically, we might predict that the first patterns of a caste system to undergo modification under urbanization would be those which seem to be most functional in small communities in which relationships are highly personal. Patterns of etiquette, for example, often

function to regulate potentially intimate contacts between members of different castes in situations in which such contacts cannot be eliminated by segregation. In larger communities where contacts between groups are apt to be more impersonal and segmental, systematic regulation of these contacts becomes less essential in preserving status differentials. Furthermore, it becomes more difficult to enforce patterns of etiquette under conditions of anonymity. In addition, the introduction of a competitive market economy may contribute to the breakdown of patterns of etiquette as Davis suggests (4). Certain specific patterns of segregation may also become functionally less significant in an urbanized society. In small rural communities segregation of public facilities such as libraries, parks, and schools not only serves to symbolize status differences. It also reduces considerably the number of intimate contacts between groups. In urban communities, however, the mere fact that facilities are officially integrated does not assure intimate equal-status contacts. In a large public school, for example, there may be substantial segments of the student body having minimal interaction. Enforced segregation can therefore be replaced by a form of "voluntary" segregation without markedly affecting the real basis of the caste system.

Certain fundamental changes in patterns of discrimination can therefore be expected under urbanization. As indicated above, some of these changes can be explained in terms of changes in the functional significance of the pattern in question. Other changes can be expected because of the fact that with a heterogeneous population it becomes more difficult to control deviant groups attempting to modify the status quo. The breakdown of isolation and the consequent introduction of outside influences may also affect

traditional patterns. The question remains, however, as to whether the caste system as a whole will inevitably disappear or whether it will simply be modified in form. Certainly, a large number of studies are needed in order to determine which patterns of discrimination are most likely to undergo the greatest modification and which can be expected to offer the greatest resistance to change.

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THE PURGE OF AN AGITATOR

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Early in March 1957, John A. Kasper, a national celebrity since his anti-integration exploits in Clinton, Tennessee, the preceding August, moved his base of operations to Florida. Although this state had maintained an atmosphere of peace and "moderation" while resisting school desegregation by legal maneuvers, extreme pro-segregation elements were present in the state and had been organized at least as early as 1954. There had been sporadic outbreaks of violence, particularly in the Miami area. Apparently Kasper hoped to unite the ardently pro-segregation elements into his Seaboard White Citizens Council by means of a speaking tour of the state, beginning in the small town of Chiefland. Whatever he hoped to do, he had the support of some local pro-segregation leaders, notably the former head of the Ku Klux Klan in Florida (2, p. 36).

Within less than a month after he entered Florida, Kasper left the state with no indications of success in his

mission and with the experience of having been renounced by his chief lieutenants. His effectiveness as an agitator in Florida had been destroyed. The paradox of this episode is that the instrument of destruction was an avowedly pro-segregation committee of the Florida legislature which, within its mandate to investigate organizations promoting violence, had spent most of its career investigating pro-integration groups, chiefly the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Since Kasper has become the symbol of the most militant wing of the pro-segregation movement (properly the pro-segregation countermovement), a case study of his experience with the Florida legislative committee, representative of another wing of this movement, offers valuable clues to the internal structure of social movements and to the relationship between values and tactics.

The Nature of the Segregation Countermovement. Even though seg-

regation has prevailed for some sixty years in the South, supported by both formal and informal norms, it is proper to speak of the recent resurgence of active support for the system, with an extensive collectivity devoted to preventing desegregation, as a social movement. To be more exact, it is a countermovement evoked by the successes of the *integration movement* spearheaded by the legal arm of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Although the Negro protest movement has been gaining strength since the early twenties, it took the *Brown* decision* of the U. S. Supreme Court to alert a substantial number of white people to the fact that the continued existence of segregation could not be taken for granted.

The integration movement and the segregation countermovement are both characterized by control orientations and value orientations (3, p. 327). Through litigation and the threat of reprisals at the polls, each strives to align the power of government on its side of the controversy. Through legal means, without seizure of power, each movement attempts to control indirectly the machinery of government as it relates to this issue. But in order to sustain this arduous struggle for power and, more important, in order to bring about a resolution which will not depend ultimately upon force, each movement must also work to propagate its values among the general public. Neither can afford to operate as a cabal, disregarding the judgment of the masses. Each must not only "sell" its values but must also justify to an ever-watchful public its methods of advancing them. From the pronouncements of their leaders, it is evident that both movements wish to be viewed as respect-

able, legal, and non-violent. Each seeks justification for its position in the same Constitution and in the same democratic and Christian tradition, and each seeks to discredit the other by accusing it of "resorting to" or "fomenting" violence.

If a movement seeks to cherish an image of itself as the defender of traditional values, it is embarrassed if the tactics of some of its adherents obviously violate these values. The fact that the U. S. Supreme Court has indicated that segregation, in violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, also violates traditional American values has not caused the leaders of the segregation movement to change their position relative to these values. Instead, they have sought to discredit the Fourteenth Amendment and to portray the "nine old men" as perverters of the Constitution. In a sense they have become "constitutional fundamentalists," trying to restore the true faith that is alleged to have been corrupted by modernism.

Even though this be the ideology and the approved tactics of the segregation movement, not all adherents of the movement will conform to it. Internal discipline is a problem of any social movement, and it is a particularly difficult problem in a large, loosely organized movement such as the segregation movement. Hence the problem of the "extremists" within what purports to be a moderate, respectable movement constantly arises to plague the dominant moderate wing.

Kasper in Florida. John Kasper entered Florida with violence in his wake. That he had instigated this violence may have been a matter of opinion; certainly he had not participated in it. But there was no doubt that a connection had been established in the minds of observers between

**Brown v. Board of Education*, 1954, 347 U.S. 483.

Kasper's presence and the use of violence to forestall school integration. No sooner did he enter the state than editorials began appearing in pro-segregation newspapers to the effect that his help was not needed in Florida. Shortly after his arrival he was subpoenaed by the Florida legislative committee—a committee whose allegiance to segregation was beyond question. Although its mandate from the legislature did not specify this, many newspapers regularly referred to it as "a committee to investigate the NAACP."

Statements of members of the committee, made when the subpoena was issued, contained hints that they did not regard Kasper as a friendly witness. Yet when Kasper appeared to testify before the committee, it seemed to the writer, an observer, that he had an air of confidence. Certainly his manner had changed markedly at the end of some three hours of questioning by the committee counsel.

The tactics of the committee during the hearing seemed designed to discredit John Kasper not only as a leader in the segregation movement but even as a segregationist. Through adroit questioning, counsel for the committee elicited from the witnesses' own lips the following salient points. He was shown to have no steady occupation and to have failed in the business enterprises which he had undertaken. His personal loyalty to Ezra Pound, whose anti-Semitism and indictment for treason Kasper was forced to confirm, was emphasized. He was led to admit that he had "socialized" with Negroes in Greenwich Village, even to the extent of having a Negro girl friend, and that he had attended interracial drinking parties.

Yet, while denouncing Kasper as an individual, the committee skillfully avoided compromising its allegiance to segregation as a value. In fact, its

loyalty to the cause of segregation was reaffirmed at points during the hearing. When Kasper made reference to "the Citizens Council" which he claimed to be organizing in Florida, one committee member interrupted to caution, "Let the record show that this is the *Seaboard* White Citizens Council, not the White Citizens Council," hence protecting the "moderate" organization from the taint of Kasper's activities. At one point during his testimony about his actions in Florida he was asked, "Do you think that that sort of activity helps the cause of segregation?"

But the most striking feature of the hearing and the ensuing denunciation of Kasper by his erstwhile lieutenants was the fact that very little was revealed in the hearing that had not already been publicized. Kasper's association with Pound, his ill-fated ventures in the bookstore business, and his social relations with Negroes in the North had been described in an article in *Look* magazine dated February 19, 1957, and in a series run first by a New York newspaper and later by the *Miami Herald*. In fact, the technique of questioning used by the committee counsel during much of the hearing was simply to read from these newspaper articles and then to question Kasper about them. Kasper was forced to affirm or deny them and then to give explanations as to his motives. Kasper himself recognized the paradox: when one of his lieutenants declared that he was renouncing him because he had not "told me the truth about his background," Kasper declared, "He should have known about my background — plenty of publicity has been given it!"

Analysis. It seems evident that it was not the content of the exposé that destroyed Kasper in Florida so much as it was the source. As long as the denunciations came from the

press, particularly from Northern publications, Kasper could satisfy his followers with cries of "lying newspapers" and "persecution." He could not so easily explain away the denunciations of a group that had endeared itself to the segregationists by a vigorous investigation of the NAACP.

If this committee be regarded as part of the moderate wing of the segregation movement, it is not at all paradoxical that it should attack Kasper, even though he be an arch-segregationist. As the nature of the attack indicated, his tactics were viewed as inconsistent with the ideology of respectability and hence as a source of embarrassment to the movement. He was, in effect, the victim of a "purge."

Yet there is another paradoxical feature of the relationship between moderates and extremists in the segregation movement. Although the moderates regularly—and, no doubt, sincerely—denounce the extremists, the latter serve an important function in the movement. Without their presence on the fringes of the movement, the moderates would be deprived of an important weapon in the fight for the allegiance of the public—namely, the threat of violence. The absence of conflict is a highly cherished value in American society; often the continuation of injustice is regarded as preferable to risking violence in the process of removing the injustice.

One of the most prominent points in the ideology of the segregationist movement is the argument that school desegregation will "upset the harmonious relations between the races" and "create violence and disorder." Probably the most important legal argument advanced to justify the indefinite delay of desegregation is the appeal to the police powers of the states to prevent disorder. Reliance

on this argument by officials who wish to delay desegregation indefinitely, however, places them in an embarrassing relationship with the violent, non-respectable wing of the segregation movement. Removal of the threat of violence committed by this element would, at the same time, remove one of the strongest arguments advanced by the "moderates" against compliance with the *Brown* decision "with all deliberate speed." The rejection of Kasper as an individual provides a convenient opportunity for affirming the respectability of the moderate wing.

The members of the segregationist movement who follow such leaders as Kasper constitute the "shock troops" of the movement, standing ready to play their part when legal maneuvers fail. That the "moderate" wing differentiates between them and a scapegoat such as Kasper is suggested by the attitude toward Kasper of another "respectable" pro-segregation body, the Tennessee Federation for Constitutional Government. In July 1957, Kasper, along with 11 of his followers from Clinton, Tennessee, went on trial in a Federal court for contempt of court. The Federation financed the defense of all the followers but refused to help Kasper. The "purge" of Kasper from the segregation movement can hardly be taken as evidence of a desire of the moderate wing to neutralize effectively the "extremist" wing of the movement.

Despite its obvious control orientations, the segregation movement is essentially value-oriented. The devotion of the leaders to what Myrdal called "valuations on specific planes" (in this case the regional value of segregation), as well as to the general valuations of "the American creed," is evident (1, p. xlvii). This value conflict has existed for a long time, but now it has become manifest and criti-

cal. The desegregation decisions by the U. S. Supreme Court constitute a demand for the abandonment of the specific valuations in favor of the general valuations.

In trying to defend one set of values while clinging to another conflicting set, the leaders of the segregation movement find themselves in a precarious position. They recognize that the value conflict does not exist to the same degree in other parts of the nation as it does in the South. There is little possibility that their regional value of segregation can be sold to the rest of the nation, to a congressional majority, or to the Supreme Court. There has been an attempt to solicit support by appealing to other values, such as states' rights and anti-Communism, but this campaign has shown few signs of success. It certainly does not promise to put an immediate stop to the continuing encroachment of desegregation in the Southern region.

Secondly, the leaders of the resistance cannot be sure of their own following in the South. Although a majority of white Southerners will pay lip service to segregation, out of conviction or for the sake of conformity, it is not clear how many of them would maintain their allegiance when confronted with a clear-cut choice between segregation and such important values as respect for law and the preservation of public schools. Furthermore, the leaders find themselves torn between the two sets of values, and their effectiveness in defending the value of segregation is circum-

scribed by the necessity of affirming their support of values that conflict with it.

Hence, they are ultimately reduced to dependence upon sheer power to maintain segregation—power asserted through litigation, evasive laws, and interposition of the type utilized by Faubus in Arkansas. When such means as these have been exhausted, "mass resistance" is the necessary step. But if the general values to which the movement subscribes are not to be violated, bringing the defection of many followers and inviting drastic measures by the central government, this resistance must be passive and nonviolent. This poses another dilemma. Will passive acts, such as withdrawal of children from school by white parents, actually stem this tide of desegregation? It is doubtful that they will, and the leaders seem to have little trust in their effectiveness. Hence, they are forced into the position of constantly postulating the threat of disorder, violence, and bloodshed, although they cannot and do not approve of such tactics. Frequent references to the threat of such tactics plus professions of inability to prevent them take on the nature of a self-fulfilling prophecy, creating the milieu in which reckless leaders arise.

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SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL STATUS

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THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN SELF-GOVERNING AND NON-SELF-GOVERNING AREAS

Several earlier articles by the author have dealt with the concept of capacity for self-government and various approaches to its measurement.* The numerous political entities, countries or areas of the world were dichotomized by the author according to political status as of 1950 with 111 classified as non-self-governing and 85 classified as self-governing, but, it should be noted, these figures have gradually changed with increasing numbers of self-governing areas. More than 50 characteristics of political entities with data available for a large proportion of the self-governing and non-self-governing areas were statistically manipulated in order to determine which items most efficiently discriminated between self-governing and non-self-governing areas.** Numerous variables thought to discriminate between self-governing and non-self-governing areas were found to have little or no discriminating power; others were highly discriminating. It should be emphasized, however, that the existence of discriminating items cannot in itself be accepted as evidence that an area must have certain characteristics in order to be self-governing. On the other hand, the in-

ability to differentiate political status using economic items that have been held of crucial importance to capacity for self-government certainly reveals the fact that untested and erroneous hypotheses have frequently been a basis for the planning and policy of colonial powers and other self-governing administrative authorities. It should also be noted that some variables that were highly correlated with political status when presented on a quantum basis had a lower correlation when placed on a per capita basis, leading to the conclusion that size is an underlying variable behind many of the differences found in self-governing as contrasted to non-self-governing areas. The data show that not only is population size of great importance in determining the differences between self-governing and non-self-governing areas, but that area is likewise of crucial importance and seems to underlie many other variables.

Additive Scales. Several scales were developed during the course of the earlier research. Single items were combined into additive scales, using identical weights for each item. Shorter versions of the scale were also developed using either equal weights or weights obtained by item analysis in order to maximize classification efficiency. While simple additive scales gave much higher scores to self-governing areas than to non-self-governing areas, considerable overlapping of scores also existed, depending on the number of items used in the scale and the weighting system employed.*** One indication of the validity of these scales may be seen in the changed or changing political status of such high-

*For a definition of terms and a description of the basic hypotheses and research techniques involved, see (5; 6). Also see (7, Chs. II, III) for an elaboration and extension of the research cited above.

**The data were, in large part, taken from the *Statistical Yearbook* and *Demographic Yearbook* of the United Nations. The earlier study made use of data for about 1947, whereas data for the later study were for 1950. Detailed statistical tables supplementary to both of the articles cited above may be obtained from the author upon request.

***For an excellent description of how such scales might have practical application, taking into consideration regional cultural variations, see (2).

scoring areas as Indonesia, Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Malaya, Puerto Rico and Ghana, to mention a few that have occurred since the inception of this research. In some cases the transition has been orderly, but in others the unwillingness of administering powers to read that which has been clearly written upon the wall, quite literally in many instances, has led to violence and ultimate change, pleasant or otherwise.

Scale Analysis. The Guttman technique for scale analysis was applied to the data but the more or less heterogeneous items available did not constitute a scalable universe that could be labeled, "capacity for self-government," or anything else that one might wish to call it. The evidence indicates that "capacity for self-government" is not a unidimensional variable underlying the diverse and changing response patterns to be found as we move from one end of the continuum to the other. And it certainly does not appear to be a dichotomous variable with one set of response patterns for self-governing areas and another for non-self-governing areas. It cannot be said that consistent and systematically decreasing amounts of the items that make up the scale enable us to place political entities on a continuum in an unambiguous fashion. But this does not completely negate the finding that simple additive scales permit a relatively high degree of discrimination between self-governing and non-self-governing areas. It has been suggested that further research may find that subcategories of items constitute separate scales, a point to be taken up in other articles.

Before leaving this summary of completed research we must emphasize that the population of political entities or areas was dichotomized on the basis of political status in both of the previously mentioned studies and that any comparisons made or scales

derived were cast in terms of the problem of differentiating between areas with contrasting political status. This means that more than the level of socio-economic development was involved and that other items were pertinent as well in construction of the scales; this point will be clarified as we progress.

THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Characteristics of Underdeveloped Areas. Approaching the problem in terms of developed as contrasted to underdeveloped areas, we may operationally define underdeveloped areas in numerous ways. When referring to underdeveloped areas we usually think in terms of areas with neither their extractive nor manufacturing industries developed to near their potential capacity; the development that has taken place is more likely to be in the extraction of minerals or other raw materials rather than in the final processing or manufacture into consumers' goods. We think of agriculture as backward compared to standards in the United States; inefficient hand tools, poor seeds and a paucity of fertilizer characterize a subsistence agriculture that usually produces precious little for the family, sometimes a small surplus for the nearby market, but not enough for export in most cases. Land tenure systems as well as the size of holdings result in lowered initiative and efficiency. If agriculture is on a large scale it is of the plantation type but may still be relatively inefficient in its techniques or its employment of the available labor supply. Livestock are likely to be scrawny and unproductive, or utilized inefficiently, or perhaps not at all if religion forbids. The local market is not readily reached by the producer during some seasons due to the absence of all-weather roads; when the producer arrives at the market he finds himself unable to bargain effectively. Although production is ba-

sically primary in the underdeveloped economy the scarcity of factory manufactured consumers' goods and the availability of labor results in some tertiary production of a relatively inefficient nature. Hand labor and extensive breaking of bulk, such as is carried on by housewives in a developed economy, conspire to keep prices high. Even when unemployment does not appear high, partial employment or disguised unemployment is almost sure to be exceedingly high. Planning or organization of the economy is difficult, lacking adequate transportation and communication. The mass media have a low circulation or are absent. Per capita consumption of consumers' goods is low because of the low purchasing power of the population. Malnutrition reduces the energy available for productive endeavour. And at the same time the population of an underdeveloped area may be expanding rapidly because of its high birth rate and partially controlled death rate, unless the area is faced with severe drought and famine or unusual epidemics. A disproportionate number of children may not survive to productive adulthood, placing a strain on the available food supply which is probably increasing at a less rapid rate than the population. Formal education is limited and labor remains unskilled. Professional and technical personnel are lacking. This is only a brief and general summary of some of the characteristics usually attributed to underdeveloped areas.

The Geographical Boundaries of Underdevelopment. Unfortunately, we do not have the data that are needed to classify areas as developed or underdeveloped according to definitions based on the proportion of a country's total human and natural resources that have been developed to fullest capacity, that is, capacity at the present stage of the development of science and technology. Since we do not have

these data and have rejected several popular approaches to the classification of areas as developed or underdeveloped, we will begin with a more or less arbitrary regional scheme in which most political entities take their classification from the characteristics of those entities about which we know the most (7, Ch. 1). Thus, the underdeveloped areas are: Central America, including the Caribbean; South America, with the exception of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay; Africa, with the exception of the Union of South Africa; the Middle East; Asia, with the exception of the Soviet Union and Japan; and Oceania, with the exception of Australia, New Zealand and Hawaii. Approximately 63 per cent of the world's population may be found in underdeveloped areas according to this classification; the "two-thirds of the world" figure is frequently seen in both popular and professional journals. Approximately 54 per cent of the world's land area is in countries classified as underdeveloped. Forty-eight political entities or areas are classified as developed and 147 are classified as underdeveloped.*

Scaling Development. After classifying the areas as developed or underdeveloped, each was given a score based on seventeen items indicative of development, with each item having the same weight on the scale and the procedure being essentially the same as that employed in developing scales that differentiated between self-governing and non-self-governing areas.** Each area received two points for each

*For a complete classification with population, land area, etc., of each political entity see (7, Ch. 1).

**The items were as follows: tons of railway freight per 1000 population, pieces of rolling stock per 1000 population, grain and food production *per capita*, number of inhabitants per physician, commercial energy consumption *per capita*, number of radios per 1000 inhabitants, crude birth rate, production of commercial and non-commercial energy *per capita*, steel produc-

item on which it fell in the "most favorable subcategory" and one point for each item on which it fell in the "least favorable subcategory."* The "most favorable subcategory" was operationally defined as that subcategory of the item in which those areas classified as developed are to be found. The "least favorable subcategory" was, of course, that in which the areas defined as underdeveloped are to be most frequently found. This operational approach resulted in labeling or arranging the subcategories as we would expect them to be labeled or arranged, considering traditional conceptions of social and economic underdevelopment in the United States and other Western industrialized nations. Cutting points for the continuums of each variable were established in such a manner as to discriminate most efficiently between developed and underdeveloped areas.

Although this paper is not intended to be primarily methodological it should be noted that while the procedures described above may appear tautological and rather meaningless to some, they serve the purpose of lending empirical validation to the geographical classification of political en-

tities as developed or underdeveloped. The reader may find the rationale for scaling techniques herein mentioned in the articles and volume previously cited, as well as a discussion of items appearing on the scale. Let it suffice to say at this point that the development scores by geographical regions were those that we would expect, taking into consideration popular and professional conceptions of these areas. This may be seen in the development scores by geographical areas shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1
DEVELOPMENT SCORES BY
GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS

| Area | Unweighted Mean Scores | Mean Scores Weighted by Population of Each Political Entity |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|---|
| North America | 28.75 | 33.99 |
| Europe | 28.23 | 31.62 |
| Oceania | 23.54 | 30.06 |
| South America | 23.60 | 24.28 |
| Central America and Caribbean | 22.25 | 23.65 |
| Central, East and South Asia | 19.47 | 20.85 |
| Africa | 18.44 | 19.03 |
| Middle East | 20.37 | 18.36 |
| Southeastern Asia | 19.40 | 18.11 |

IMPLICATIONS OF SCORES ON THE SCALE DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN SELF-GOVERNING AND NON-SELF- GOVERNING AREAS

Having briefly mentioned the research that has thus far been completed, we may now present some tentative conclusions and implications. These conclusions, since they derive from two separate but related research problems, should be presented in two categories. The first is concerned with the research that found a scale composed of numerous quite diverse items capable of differentiating self-governing from non-self-governing areas. Scores on the scale were rather highly correlated with political status; phi coefficients of correlation exceeding

*If no information was available for an item, points were assigned to the area on a *pro rata* basis, i.e., an area received a proportion of 2's and 1's for the "no information" items that was determined by the proportion of 2's and 1's that it had received on items for which data were available. This practice might give some advantage to areas with well developed systems of social and economic bookkeeping but inasmuch as the development of bookkeeping is probably a good indicator of general development, no great violence has been done to the relative scores of the various areas.

tion, number of telephones per 1000 inhabitants, commercial energy production *per capita*, motor vehicles in use per 1000 population, percent of population in urban areas, iron ore production, percent of population enrolled as students, infant mortality rates, and number of inhabitants per hospital bed.

.90 were obtained in both the earlier and later studies, although no single factors or combination of factors invariably differentiated self-governing from non-self-governing areas. The second set of tentative conclusions and implications is derived from the research that found socio-economic development scores related to political status.

Although scale scores did differentiate self-governing from non-self-governing areas, we have indicated that these differences do not seem to preclude self-government but may in fact be the consequences of colonial administrative policy. Therefore, we may wish to examine colonial policy in order to see how it may have brought about comparatively low scores for non-self-governing areas even though statesmen have proclaimed tutelage and development as the goal of administrative policy in colonies and in Trust Territories administered by self-governing powers for the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.

Scale Scores and Administrative Policy. Division rather than federation or union of dependencies has frequently been the policy of colonial powers. We shall see that division of an area into numerous political entities or colonies lowers the score of each on the scale that purports to measure "capacity for self-government" for the simple reason that

population size and area are important underlying variables. Union or federation of various areas would, in many instances, raise the score to one comparable to that of self-governing areas in the region. Let us look at such an example. A British Caribbean Federation was organized in 1956, consisting of Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands. On a simple additive scale consisting of 29 items with equal weights, a scoring system of 2, 1, 0 and a correlation with political status of .906, scores were obtained for the various political entities making up the British Caribbean Federation, as shown in Table 2.* The scores of other areas in the Caribbean are also presented in Table 2. Individually, no member of the British Caribbean Federation has a very impressive score on the scale but if the several island groups are considered as one area the score is 41, comparing very favorably with the average score of other areas in the Caribbean as well as with the scores of self-governing areas that are presumably capable of self-government. And it must be remembered that this

*If the scoring system is changed so that "no information" assigns one point to an area for the item, the results are still essentially the same, i.e., the British Caribbean Federation has a score of 43 while the average of other Caribbean areas is 41.6, with only Cuba's 52 and Puerto Rico's 44 higher (7, pp. 474-475).

TABLE 2
SCALE SCORES OF CARIBBEAN POLITICAL ENTITIES

| BRITISH CARIBBEAN FEDERATION | | OTHER CARIBBEAN AREAS | |
|--|----|-------------------------|------|
| Trinidad & Tobago | 38 | Cuba | 50 |
| Barbados | 36 | Puerto Rico | 41 |
| Jamaica | 36 | Dominican Republic | 40 |
| Leeward Islands | 30 | Bermuda | 37 |
| Windward Islands | 25 | Bahama Islands | 36 |
| | | Netherlands West Indies | 34 |
| | | Virgin Islands | 28 |
| | | Haiti | 26 |
| Combined Score of British Caribbean Federation | 41 | AVERAGE | 36.5 |

is not the 56-item scale to which we have previously referred and which placed a considerable premium upon size; had the 56-item scale been employed the proportionate increase in score for the British Caribbean Federation would have been even greater. With the exception of population and land area, all items were given on a *per capita* basis. Size plays only a relatively small part but it should still be noted that combination of the political entities making up the British Caribbean Federation increased the score considerably; what one member of the Federation lacked was sometimes present in another, thus increasing the total score of the Federation.

Another example is the proposed Central African Federation composed of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.* Individually these political entities have the scale scores presented in Table 3. Scale scores of self-governing African political entities are shown as well as those of several African political entities that are approaching self-government. When the Central African Federation is placed on a scale as a single political entity it has a score of 35, only one

*See (3). This article makes a very careful analysis of the advantages of bringing together the resources of the area through federation.

point higher than that of Southern Rhodesia, but comparing very favorably with the majority of the self-governing or nearly self-governing political entities in Africa.

The possibility, and in some cases probability, of various combinations of political entities is seen in other examples from Africa.**

It is not unreasonable to conclude that the divisive policies of colonial powers during the nineteenth century were inconsistent with their avowed policy of tutelage and development of capacity for self-government, i.e., development of characteristics similar to those of self-governing political entities like themselves. Other policies

**For an excellent discussion of these combinations see (4). Combination of British Togoland having a scale score of only 8 with Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast), which is about ten times as large and has a scale score of 28, has been carried out following a United Nations supervised plebiscite. This combination set a precedent for the British Cameroons joining Nigeria. Nigeria has a population about twenty-five times that of the British Cameroons and a scale score of 31 in contrast to that of 8 for the British Cameroons. Another possibility might be French Togoland and the French Cameroons, the former with a scale score of 24 and the latter with a score of 25, although in this case, one political entity, the Cameroons, is only about three times as large in population as the territory with which it might be combined. By contrast, it should be

TABLE 3
SCALE SCORES OF SOME AFRICAN POLITICAL ENTITIES

| CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION | | OTHER SELF-GOVERNING OR PARTIALLY SELF-GOVERNING AREAS | |
|---|----|---|------|
| Southern Rhodesia | 34 | Union of South Africa | 44 |
| Nyasaland | 24 | Egypt | 41 |
| Northern Rhodesia | 23 | Algeria | 39 |
| | | Tunisia | 35 |
| | | Morocco | 33 |
| | | Nigeria | 31 |
| | | Sudan | 29 |
| | | Ghana | 28 |
| | | Ethiopia | 27 |
| | | Liberia | 22 |
| | | Libya | 17 |
| Combined Score of Central African Federation | 35 | AVERAGE | 31.4 |

such as limitations on the development of production of consumers' goods along with intensified exploitation of mineral resources might be examined. For example, emphasis on the production of crude oil for export will not increase the *per capita* consumption and level of living in an area as much as will more balanced development of the economy. The consequences of uneven development may be seen by examination of the data making up the scale scores of specific political entities. Educational policy should also be considered with reference to its bearing on the development of a labor force capable of manning an industrial establishment, maintaining adequate transportation and communication facilities, or dealing with public health and sanitation problems.

Pressure for Self-Government. It has previously been pointed out that, were we principally interested in differentiating between self-governing and non-self-governing areas, a scale emphasizing other than *per capita* data would have been more effective in the sense that it would have shown the relative power of most self-governing areas as contrasted to most non-self-governing areas. Power or potential power, or ability to secure the assistance of a powerful self-governing area is probably crucial in determining ability to secure and maintain political independence. This is readily

noted that Italian Somaliland is scheduled to achieve independence in 1960 and has a scale score of only 22. Three other entities about which considerable discussion has taken place with reference to independence or increasing increments of self-government are Tanganyika with a score of 25, Ruanda-Urundi with a score of 17, and Belgian Congo with a score of 34. Another suggestion for unification, but one that is highly improbable, is that of the Ewe-speaking peoples and would involve Ghana, British Togoland and French Togoland. Both a Togoland unification movement and a Cameroons unification movement have developed. For an anthropological view of development problems see (1).

seen if one simply lists those political entities that have secured self-government since World War II. In Africa we have Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Sudan. In Asia we find Malaya, Pakistan, India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Mongolian Republic. In the Middle East self-government has been attained by Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Iceland has obtained independence and Korea, although divided, has theoretically regained her independence.

This paper is not intended as an argument for the immediate application of any of the various scales or scoring systems that have been mentioned, but only to strongly suggest that, although we have not discovered any specific factor or combination of factors that constitute capacity for self-government and are therefore a prerequisite to it, we have some fairly definite ideas as to what kind of non-self-governing areas have the capacity to make themselves heard in one way or another and thus acquire their independence or self-government. The data should make us very apprehensive of attempts to deny self-government to areas whose scale scores indicate that they are likely to obtain it anyway. There are strong implications for administrative policy in non-self-governing areas and for foreign policy in general, from the research just mentioned.

IMPLICATIONS OF SCORES ON A SCALE MEASURING SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Scores of Political Entities on the Scale. We may now move on to a discussion of the second problem, that of measuring the socio-economic development of political entities and relating it to their political status. This is the socio-economic development scale previously described and in it we have excluded size and area as deter-

TABLE 4
DEVELOPMENT SCORES OF POLITICAL ENTITIES BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

| Scores | North America | Europe | Oceania | South America | Central America & Caribbean | Central & South Asia | Africa | Middle East | Southeast Asia |
|--------|--------------------------------------|---|--|------------------------------------|--|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------------|
| 34 | U. S. A. Canada | Luxembourg Austria Germany United Kingdom Norway Sweden Belgium | Australia | | | | | | |
| 33 | | Italy Czechoslovakia France Netherlands | | Argentina | | | | | |
| 32 | | Finland Ireland Iceland Switzerland | | Chile | | | Union of South Africa | | |
| 31 | | Poland Spain | New Zealand | | | Japan | | | |
| 30 | Alaska (U. S.) | Denmark Hungary | | | | U. S. S. R. | | | |
| 29 | | Monaco | Guam (U. S.) | | Neth. W. Indies Canal Zone (U. S.) | | | | |
| 28 | St. Pierre & Miquelon (French) | | Hawaii (U. S.) New Caledonia (French) | | | | | Israel | |
| 27 | | | Nauru (U. K.) Trust Territory Pac. (U. S.) | Uruguay Falkland Is. (U. K.) | Cuba | | | | |
| 26 | | Malta & Gozo (U. K.) Gibraltar (U. K.) Romania | Tonga (U. K.) Norfolk Island (Australia) Amer. Samoa (U. S.) | Venezuela | Mexico Trinidad & Tobago (U. K.) Bermuda (U. K.) Barbados (U. K.) | | St. Helena (U. K.) | | |

TABLE 4
DEVELOPMENT SCORES OF POLITICAL ENTITIES BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

TABLE 4
DEVELOPMENT SCORES OF POLITICAL ENTITIES BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

| Scores | North America | Europe | Oceania | South America | Central America & Caribbean | Central & South Asia | Africa | Middle East | Southeast Asia |
|--------|---|----------|--|------------------------|--|---|--|--------------------------|---|
| 25 | | | | Peru | Puerto Rico (U. S.) Virgin Islands (U. S.) | | S. Rhodesia (U. K.) Bahrein | | Singapore (U. K.) |
| 24 | Yugoslavia Portugal Channel Is. (U. K.) Liechtenstein | | Cook Island (N. Z.) | | Panama | | | Kuwait Cyprus (U. K.) | |
| 23 | Greenland (Denmark) | Bulgaria | Tokelau (N. Z.) | French Guiana (French) | Bahama Is. (U. K.) | Tangier | | | |
| 22 | | | Papua (Aust.) Niue (N. Z.) French Oceania (French) | Brazil | Formosa | Seychelles (U. K.) | Qatar Iraq Lebanon Saudi Arabia | | Thailand |
| 21 | | | Gilbert & Ellice Is. (U. K.) Fiji (U. K.) | Surinam (Neth.) | Brit. Honduras (U. K.) Martinique (French) Guadeloupe (French) | Reunion (Fr.) Mauritius (U. K.) Span. Poss. in No. Africa (Spain) | | | |
| 20 | Greece Albania | | West. Samoa (N. Z.) Ryukyu Island (U. S.) | Paraguay Colombia | Leeward Is. (U. K.) Jamaica (U. K.) Honduras Costa Rica | Algeria (Fr.) French Somali (French) | Turkey Iran Aden Col. (U. K.) | | British Borneo (U. K.) Philippines New Guinea (Neth.) |
| 19 | | | British Solomon Island (U. K.) | British Guiana (U. K.) | Dominican Republic | Ceylon India | Basutoland (U. K.) Ruandi Urundi (Belgium) Tunisia (Fr.) | Syria | |

TABLE 4
DEVELOPMENT SCORES OF POLITICAL ENTITIES BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

[illegible]

minants of scale scores and have concentrated on seventeen items that purport to measure social and economic development. Our findings correlate with common-sense impressions.

Table 4 shows the development scores of all political entities and is arranged by geographical regions. The administering power is indicated for each entity.* Any relationships that may be present between development scores and political status or administering authorities' policy are difficult to perceive with such a table; Table 5 is provided as an additional aid. In

the question: how have they fared at the hands of administering authorities charged with their development? Again, the findings are laden with implications for administrative policy in trust territories or overseas colonies. Only one non-self-governing entity has a score of 30 while twenty-eight self-governing areas have scores of 30 or above. It should also be noted that self-governing entities have a wide range of development scores. Some of those scoring the lowest have only recently obtained self-government or have been the object of "exploitation"

TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT SCORES OF POLITICAL ENTITIES BY
GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS

| Scores | North America | | Europe | | Oceania | | South America | | Central America & Caribbean | | Central & South Asia | | Africa | | Middle East | | Southeast Asia | |
|--------|---------------|-------|--------|-----|---------|-----|---------------|-----|-----------------------------|-----|----------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|----------------|-----|
| | SG* | NSG** | SG | NSG | SG | NSG | SG | NSG | SG | NSG | SG | NSG | SG | NSG | SG | NSG | SG | NSG |
| 34 | 2 | | 7 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 33 | | | 4 | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 32 | | | 4 | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 31 | | | 2 | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | |
| 30 | 1 | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 29 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 2 | | 1 | | | | | | | |
| 28 | | 2 | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | |
| 27 | | | | | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| 26 | | | 1 | 2 | | 3 | 1 | | 1 | 3 | | | 1 | | | | | |
| 25 | | | | | | 1 | | | | 2 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 |
| 24 | | | 3 | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | |
| 23 | 1 | | 2 | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | |
| 22 | | | | | 3 | | 1 | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 4 | | 1 | |
| 21 | | | | | 2 | | 1 | | 3 | | | | 3 | | | | | |
| 20 | | | 2 | | 2 | 2 | | 2 | 2 | | | | 2 | | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 19 | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | | 1 | | | |
| 18 | | | | | 1 | | 2 | | 1 | | | 1 | 5 | | | | 2 | |
| 17 | | | 1 | 2 | | 3 | | | 3 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 27 | 6 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

* Self-governing

** Non-self-governing

Table 5, we have indicated the number of political entities on each point of the development continuum and their status as self-governing or non-self-governing. We may again raise

by private corporations or agencies of powerful self-governing countries. With the exception of the recently acquired Ryukyu Is. and Bonin Is., all U.S. non-self-governing entities have

*The political status of entities or areas shown in Tables 4 and 5 is that which prevailed at the inception of the studies to which we have referred. As has been previously mentioned, the status of several entities has changed; although changes are few and do not modify the general picture to any great extent, it is best to list them at this point. The Gold Coast, Tunisia and Morocco are now self-governing. British

Togo and has joined the Gold Coast (Ghana) and the northern part of British Cameroons is being administered as a part of Nigeria. French Indo-China has been divided into four more or less self-governing entities, Laos, South Vietnam, North Vietnam and Cambodia. French India and the Maldives Islands are no longer separate political entities, the former now is a part of India and the latter of Ceylon.

scores of 25 or above while most other non-self-governing entities have lower development scores. Non-self-governing entities administered by the British government have a wide range of development scores. French non-self-governing entities have a range of development scores as great as those of Britain's dependencies but are somewhat more skewed toward the lower end of the scale than are those of Britain. Development scores of non-self-governing areas administered by the Netherlands are varied but do not fall at the lowest end of the continuum; those administered by Belgium are close to the bottom of the scale. Those administered by Spain are close to the bottom of the scale or at the bottom while those administered by Portugal have the lowest possible score in every case.

Interpreting Scale Scores. Any comparisons that have been made, perhaps invidious, are for the period around 1950 and changes have no doubt taken place since that time. It is not unreasonable to assume that changes for the better have taken place in one country's non-self-governing areas as well as in those of another. While much has been written about the merits of direct and indirect rule, combinations of these policies, or their applicability at one stage of development as contrasted to another, the proof is in the pudding; one has only to observe the development scores of similar political entities having undergone different forms of administration, to see diverse results. Rather than for us to select specific examples of this point, it is suggested that the reader pursue his own examples to see if his hypotheses concerning administrative policy are in some way substantiated or rejected by development scores. Unfortunately, the scale is not sensitive enough to measure the relatively small differences that may exist between the multitude of African en-

ities at the lowest end of the scale.

Cultural diversities must be taken into consideration in evaluating these scale scores since some areas have been more amenable to development than have others. Geographical location may also play a part in how a non-self-governing area develops, since its proximity to a self-governing area other than the one supposedly in control may have a bearing on the course of development. Geographical location has not been without other consequences in the sense that at some time or another a political entity may have had a strategic location that resulted in an unusual direction of development to suit the convenience of the administering power. Strategic location plays a part in ability to maintain political status as well. Location in an area may have been meaningful in one way at one time and in another way at another time. All of these are, of course, variables that we would not overlook in explaining the development scores shown in Table 4. Perhaps it is at this point that we might best be joined by the historian and political scientist.

The hypothesized consequences of self-government with considerable development may also be seen in numerous cases, for example, in the difficulties of low-scoring self-governing areas. The consequences of refusing self-government to high-scoring non-self-governing areas are continuously seen in current news reports, as we have previously suggested.

Implications for Foreign Policy. It is quite unlikely that one possessed of the kind of data presented here, or similar comparative data, would not question the colonial policy, past and present, of European powers. It is equally unlikely that one can avoid questioning the wisdom of our own predominantly military aid to underdeveloped political entities, and the construction of military bases in non-

self-governing entities, without taking into consideration the larger problems of social, economic and political development. Since Asia, Africa and the Middle East score as poorly as they do, one would be inclined to concentrate on social and economic development programs in these areas rather than on less meaningful military aid programs, at least less meaningful in terms of the aspirations of the indigenous populations.

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COMMUNICATIONS AND OPINION

COMMENT ON "CHANGES IN MORAL VALUES"

To the Editor:

The task of describing patterns of change in moral values in this country, even among college students, is certainly an important one and deserving of serious and sophisticated treatment. The report on this matter by Rettig and Pasamanick carried in this journal (Spring, 1959) unfortunately can only serve to reinforce the arguments of those who are fond of labelling the bulk of sociological research "pretentiously trivial" and "abstracted empiricism."

Rettig and Pasamanick have attempted to assess changes that have occurred over approximately a thirty-year period. The same 50-item questionnaire, with a 10-point scale of judgment on each item, was administered to non-comparable and non-random samples of college students in 1929, 1939, 1949, and 1958. In the interest of "permitting more interpretable comparisons" among the four samples, each item has been ranked within each sample. The authors assert, "statistical computations based on ranks do not necessitate assumptions of equality of intervals or normality of distribution." However, no statistical tests of any sort are involved in the analysis, and therefore it appears that they must believe that more reliable comparisons are possible upon the elimination of the above assumptions. In particular, with a 10-point scale on each item, the assumption of equality of intervals may indeed be a source of distortion. But the translation of a summary score or an average score — it is not reported which has been used — into a rank does not, in fact, eliminate the assumption of equality of intervals, for this assumption is still involved in the derivation of the summary or average score. The belief that the assumption has been eliminated in these data is mischievous, for it seems to suggest to the analysts a greater confidence in the reliability of their comparisons than they would feel warranted if they believed the assumption had not been eliminated.

For purposes of comparison, especially when there is a very limited range of variation in the raw score data, the ranks alone may be quite untrustworthy. It may well be that the raw scores on a number of items cluster quite closely together for a given year, i.e., a difference of several rank positions may result from very small score differences. Assuming that the test items are not perfectly reliable and that there is sampling variability, it is then possible that what appears to be a fairly substantial difference between ranks is quite unreliable.

Therefore, what appears to be a substantial change in rank from one year to another may be quite unreliable.

Before it can be accepted that the differences in rank of a given pattern represent true differences, some criterion must be set up according to which a judgment can be made. For example, one set of ranks for a given year might be taken as parameters, and the analyst might test the statistical significance of the changes in rank for another year. Even though crude and not strictly legitimate, such a statistical test would provide some basis for evaluating the importance of a change in a given number of rank positions. At least, the analysts could say that there is some reason to believe that a given amount of difference is greater than that which would ordinarily be expected by random sampling. As it stands, the Rettig and Pasamanick analysis often suggests that almost no difference in ranks is attributable to sampling, which is, of course, incredible. But what is worse, the analysts have obviously used a variable criterion of judgment of significance of differences. For example, they suggest by their classification that a pattern of ranks of an item over the four time periods such as 12, 10, 10, 9 is a decline worth taking account of, but a pattern such as 42, 41, 42, 38 shows no consistency and is not a decline worth taking account of. Again, when an item (18) shows a fall in rank of five places from 1929 to 1939, the change is interpreted as a "depression fall," but a fall of six places from 1949 to 1958 is apparently ignored; otherwise, the item would presumably have been classified as one of those that show no consistent pattern. Again, a drop or rise of three positions from 1929 to 1939 is considered sufficient to classify an item as showing a "depression fall" or "depression hump," but if there is a change of only three rank positions between any other two time periods, an item is considered stable, with the exception noted above. In sum, there is no basis for judging that the differences in rankings of the fifty items are any greater than might be expected among four random samples from the same population or from four populations in which the rankings of the fifty items are the same.

There is another matter, too, which from a purely statistical point of view suggests that the inferences of Rettig and Pasamanick are extremely questionable. They choose to comment in particular upon those cases of extreme differences in rank position from one period to another. In a set of comparisons of rankings of fifty items among four samples, a few extreme differences would be expected simply as a result

of sampling; and it seems to me that only a few extreme differences are found. Without explicit *a priori* predictions of where the extreme differences would be expected to occur, a great deal of credence in the greater importance of the observed extreme differences cannot be given.

It seems to me that what is most striking about the Rettig and Pasamanick presentation is the heterogeneity of the items which make up each of the seven patterns of rank changes which they identify. If one attempts to classify the items in any way that gives more than one or two items in a category, I think it will be found that several different patterns of change can be identified in each category.

Sincerely,
DAVID GOLD

State University of Iowa

REPLY TO GOLD

To the Editor:

We are indeed grateful for Professor Gold's forceful reiteration of our statements on the methodological shortcomings of our paper, "Changes in Moral Values Over Three Decades." We feel that such repeated criticism will help to induce a more cautious attitude in the reader in evaluating our findings.

These shortcomings include the non-comparability of the samples, the utilization of ranked data, and the use of arbitrary criteria in categorizing the observed changes. Our interest in the longitudinal study of changing moral values necessitated the use of Crissman's data — to our knowledge the only available empirical data in this area which predate the depression. Unfortunately, the only data still in existence on these three groups are the mean severity of judgments, as they appeared in Professor Crissman's publications (see second footnote on page 322). Since the data on the individual responses of these three samples no longer exist, we were forced to rank all of the mean judgments and draw comparisons based on ranks. We are in full agreement with Dr. Gold that the use of ranked data is a very crude procedure. There is, however, one advantage to the use of ranks, namely, that ranks do not necessitate assumption of equality of intervals or normality of distribution. This one advantage of ranking also applies to comparisons based on ranked mean judgments. Our intentions in making reference to the one advantage in using ranks was not to increase confidence but partially to justify the use of ranks.

In our discussion of the findings, we

chose to comment in particular upon cases of extreme differences in rank positions, since the two items with the most extreme differences were of similar content, the preservation of individual life. If we could assume equal variance in severity of judgment in 1939 and in 1958, the judgments on mercy killing rose from 2.62 to 6.36 ($t=34.0$ with 1040 d.f.). A glance at the table of t values indicates that the .001 level of significance is satisfied by a t of 3.4 for 120 d.f., whereas the t value reported above is ten times as large. Similarly, the judgment on suicide rose from 5.01 to 7.69 ($t=25.5$). It seems doubtful that such extreme values "would be expected simply as a result of sampling" as Professor Gold contends.

In relation to the third point of criticism, the arbitrary classification of items, we chose to make our classification partially in accordance with major social-historical events, such as the depression. We believe such a scheme of classification to be more meaningful when observing changes in moral judgments with time, than choosing the responses of any particular year as parameters, as Dr. Gold suggests. In placing the items into the various categories, we emphasized those items which showed a characteristic change attributable to the historical event. While "abstracted empiricism" in an area in which we know so little is, in our opinion, not unjustified, the criticism hardly applies to this procedure. The items selected in this paper were primarily those which tested hypothesized relationships. This was done rather than attempt to force observed differences into *ad hoc* categories. Thus, Item 18, falling five ranks from 1929 to 1939 and then rising again by four ranks from 1939 to 1949, is classified under "depression fall" despite the additional fall by 6 ranks from 1949 to 1958, because the classification of this item is preferably based on three points of the curve rather than on two. Also a monotonic change in an item exhibiting ranks of 12, 10, 10, 9 falling into a predicted pattern is judged more meaningful than a fluctuating pattern such as 42, 41, 42, 38. The latter would have required *post hoc* interpretation.

Some of the patterns of change did, in fact, result in the inclusion of heterogeneous items. If the homogeneity of items is the preferred criterion, we would like to call Dr. Gold's attention to our study on changes in moral judgments grouped according to moral value factors, to which reference is made in our report.

In conclusion, we agree with Dr. Gold, that "the task of describing patterns of change in moral values . . . is certainly an

important one. . . ." It is the importance of the area of investigation which prompted us to publish the study despite the methodological difficulties which were explicitly described in the paper. On balance, therefore, Professor Gold's comments are largely

inappropriate and redundant.

Sincerely yours,

SALOMON RETTIG AND
BENJAMIN PASAMANICK

Ohio State University

The graduate students of the Sociology Department of the University of California at Berkeley would like to call your attention to the forthcoming issue of **THE BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY** (formerly Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions). This unique student journal is now entering its fifth year of publication.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia: Five Essays. By C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze. The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1958. xii + 248 pp. \$5.00.

As serious and competent study of social problems becomes more widespread in the world, the cross-cultural bases for better understanding of our own American social problems will become more adequate. Important in this tendency is the program of research at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague of which van Nieuwenhuijze is Secretary and a professor. With a student body drawn from advanced researchers and officials in many parts of the Islamic world as well as Europe and the Americas, that Institute is stimulating some of the most truly cross-cultural work on social problems to be found anywhere today.

Both the work of the Institute and the book under review are "in a *lingua franca* of the Western world of the middle of the 20th century, which by some is mistakenly called English." Both thus make an excellent point that Americans as well as the British too often forget. The language owes vocabulary and syntax to the Anglo-American tradition, but it has become a much greater and more international instrument than the label "English" suggests.

Basic to an understanding of social life in Indonesia, "as in other parts of the Muslim world, . . . the substratum beneath Islam [is the] . . . 'closed community.'" Van Nieuwenhuijze tells how this type of community "occupies a place in the universe in its own right. . . . Human life in the full sense of the word is lived 'here.'" With the "closed community" as the prevalent type in Indonesia, he analyzes disintegrative and revivalist tendencies and their significance. He shows the characteristics of the spiritual life and their reaction to the current transitional period. "To 'overstress Westernization—for this is what one does when assuming that an immediate confrontation would be possible and fruitful—is to underestimate the spiritual force of Islam."

The third essay, "Japanese Islam Policy in Java 1942-1945," contains wisdom on the worldwide power struggle then and now which we Americans seldom assimilate. Both the strength and weaknesses of Japanese strategy and propaganda have American counterparts.

Two special social movements preoccupy van Nieuwenhuijze. These are the powerful Indonesian Communist Party and the revivalist Darul-Islam movement of West-

ern Java. At first, the latter showed the greater vitality, based as it was on Muslim nationalism. Later the Communists learned how to adapt their strategies to the Muslim world more effectively.

For those who are concerned with the implications of the Bandung conference and its consequences and sequels, and that should be all of us, this is an important contribution to international understanding.

ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE
Brooklyn College of the City of New York

The English Health Service: Its Origins, Structure and Achievements. By Harry Eckstein. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. xxl, 289 pp. \$5.50.

In discussions of proposals to socialize medicine in America, students of social problems will find it helpful to have factual information concerning at least one operating system of socialized medicine such as the English Health Service. Valuable lessons can be learned by social scientists in analyzing the achievements and shortcomings of the large scale reorganization of medicine which occurred in Great Britain after 1948.

Eckstein, an American political scientist, having no scalpel to grind, has presented a reasoned, sober, and well-documented account of the origins, structure and achievements of the National Health Service (N. H. S.) some ten years after its inception. He traces its origins to such factors as the Poor Laws of the early and late 19th century; the pattern of private philanthropy which produced the voluntary hospital system; the cumbersome system of National Health Insurance, which, though "compulsory," reached only half the population; the financial crises faced by two uncoordinated and often competing hospital systems, the voluntary and public hospitals; and the emergencies of two World Wars which served to reveal the inadequacies of the old system. In short, the disorganization of the old medical system as manifested by the maldistribution of hospitals, doctors, and medical services, shortages of medical personnel, hospital beds, equipment and supplies, and the low earning power of many types of specialists compared with general practitioners, was in need of considerable improvement not only to spread benefits to larger numbers of patients but also to help the doctors to relieve themselves of an inefficient system of organization.

In various chapters, Eckstein discusses the "class distribution of services" and notes that though the lower classes had

been rather favored under the old system, services were uneven and certain services such as dental and optical care were largely unavailable to them; "the condition of medicine" details the shortages and maldistribution of hospitals, shortages of good specialists in the public hospitals, the lack of coordination between the voluntary and public hospital systems, and the financial plight of both; "medical services during the war . . ." reveals how the inadequacies of the system became more apparent under wartime conditions.

In chapters on "the climate of opinion: 1920-1942" and "the government's plans: 1942-1946," Eckstein traces the development of agitation for reorganization, the British Medical Association's own early reformist zeal and later conservatism when legislation loomed imminent, and the steps in the formulation of the National Health Service Act. Chapters on "objectives and structure . . ." and "achievements and shortcomings . . ." present descriptions of the adopted plan and the administrative structure of the system and an evaluation by Eckstein in the light of the purposes of the reorganization. In an epilogue on planning, the author presents his views on the general problem of achieving rational planning with large-scale, public controlled enterprises.

An interesting point which Eckstein makes along the way is that the Health Service was not, strictly speaking, a Labor Party measure to produce an egalitarian social distribution of medical services. In fact, the middle classes were, in many respects, not as well off as the working class under the old system.

At other points, Eckstein provides examples of the effect of social and cultural factors on such things as the attitudes of physicians toward the proposed reorganization, recruitment of specialists under the old system, the inadequacies of private practice under modern conditions, and the ability of doctors to influence policy and administration under the new system.

Despite the difficulty of assessing achievements in the absence of clear cut criteria of what a medical service should achieve, Eckstein does a competent job of evaluating its successes and failures. Interestingly enough, he concludes that much of the blame for the shortcomings of the system lies with the failure to spend enough money. The purpose of the Service was "to provide better services to all: to make the teaching spirit pervade a vastly extended hospital system, to place general practice on a more modern footing, to coordinate the services in an economically and scientifically effective way, and—above

all—to inject into a medical system which has been starved for more than a generation a much larger supply of wealth. None of this has been done; only the distribution of the services has been significantly improved. Perhaps it is high time, therefore, to let the Health Service go on a spending spree, instead of continuing to subject it to the miserly penny-pinching necessary in the immediate postwar period . . ." (p. 259).

This book is necessary reading for those concerned with studying and analyzing systems of medical care and those who glibly maintain that large scale reorganizations of medicine are either "not possible" or are "quite easy." One only wishes more factual information concerning the day-to-day operation of the system had been presented.

Eckstein's analysis of the effects of certain administrative structural arrangements on the Service makes it apparent that no collective solution to the problems of medical care can be undertaken today without detailed consideration of the achievements and shortcomings of the National Health Service.

GEORGE PSATHAS

Indiana University

The Importance of Overweight. By Hilde Bruch, M.D. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1957, x + 438 pp. \$5.95.

This book must not be confounded with the medical, nutritional or plainly promotional scare literature on the dangers of overweight that is presently flooding the nation. Rather, the author, a pediatrician and clinical psychiatrist, warns against the damaging effect on mental health of the campaign against overweight. She considers the idea of a "normal weight" illiberal and repressive. She emphasizes that what is normal for one person may be pathological for another and she challenges the statistical concept of overweight, as it appears for instance in "average weight" tables, as disregarding the complex nature of human nature and inducing a confusion of mathematical correlation and causal connection. This is remarkable because her material, based partly on extensive clinical experience, partly on the available medical literature, chiefly concerns cases of excessive obesity among children and young adults that would have justified concentration on pathology to the exclusion of the more comprehensive aspects of the topic.

Indeed, Dr. Bruch's book documents the "comprehensive medicine" approach as against the still widely prevalent thinking in mechanical cause and effect relationships.

The idea that "over-eating" is the "cause" and a stern reducing regimen the "cure" of obesity is deprecated, but neither are underlying emotional disturbances singled out as the sole agent that produces overweight. Physiological and psychological factors are recognized as dynamically and functionally interrelated and inherited capacity is seen as providing a not-to-be-neglected potential upon which environmental influences work. Therapeutically, the emphasis is on psychiatric treatment, but diagnostically a wide array of factors and their multiple correlations are carefully considered. The method employed is to relate the author's own clinical and experimental experience, with unavoidable limitations not omitted from the evaluation, and simultaneously to review the relevant literature; changes in emphasis over the years and unsolved problems of research are indicated. It is in this latter regard that the sociological aspects of the topic are taken into consideration—rather wistfully, to be sure, in view of the scarcity of sociological evidence.

The "cultural frame" and the "family frame" of obesity are treated in separate chapters, but annotations of a sociological nature are found elsewhere in the text as well. The observation that obesity is a public health menace only in an economy of plenty is much to the point, but the corresponding observation that the prevailing asceticism toward food is contradictory to the pleasure principle in contemporary culture is not sufficiently followed up. However, the chapter on "thin fat people" discusses the mental strain created by the sort of overeager propaganda which makes appearance a central value to the detriment of more vital needs. Generally, the remarks

on culture are charmingly illustrated by anecdotes from many places and ages, but they are somewhat lacking in conceptualization. Perhaps, a more systematic consideration of the psychopathology of cultures—with undernourished peoples admiring corpulence as much as we do emaciation—would lead to a study of the reducing craze that is now sweeping America in terms of the theory of collective behavior rather than in terms of the very broad concept of culture itself. The remarks about the role of the family are most perceptive; but the author's comments about the influence of upward and downward mobility as well as about the insecure status of immigrants (and racial minorities!) carry the student beyond the family as such to an evaluation of the position of the members of a family in the system of social stratification and their drift in the process of social change. Perhaps the following summary could be attempted: being the hallmark of middle class status, obesity becomes the stigma of middle class culture, so much so that the resulting middle class insecurity takes refuge in compulsory conformity to an anti-obesity model of appearance. To be sure, such an outline of a sociological theory of obesity is merely adumbrated in Dr. Bruch's book, but this is more than can be said of any comparable study. Medical sociologists, social psychologists and students of social stratification—not to speak of social workers—can learn much from it. The book contains charts of measurements and test scores, a good bibliography, and an index.

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